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All over the world, several thousands of migrants go missing 
when they attempt to flee from war, violence, persecution, 
repressive regimes, systematic human rights violations, etc. 
Thousands die each year in deadly shipwrecks in a desperate 
attempt to enter Europe and the United Kingdom. In these 
instances of deaths and loss, international human rights law 
imposes duties on states to account for people missing in 
transnational migration and to respect the rights of members of 
their families. Despite such provisions, states sometimes deny 
that they have obligations to deal with cases of migrants reported 
missing in transnational migration until migrants reach their 
territories. Such conflicting claims raise serious questions about 
migration policies and governance and how the subject of missing 
migrants should be dealt with at the international level. The 
newly adopted UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and 
Regular Migration (Objective 8(a-f)) answers a part of the 
question by recognising that migration generally, and missing 
migrants specifically, is a transnational social problem which 
requires greater cooperation amongst states as well as policies 
with transnational effects. The United Kingdom was one of the 
earliest countries to endorse the new migration compact, hinting 
that it respects the sovereign rights of states to determine and 
implement their own migration policies and protect national 
interest. The Article asks if, from a transnational law perspective, 
the UK migration policy in relation to missing migrants is 
transnationally effective such as to facilitate enforcement of the 
new Global Compact and other related international instruments 
nationally. Existing evidence in the literature shows limited 
knowledge about the transnational effects of UK policies in 
relation to missing migrants. Therefore, the Article highlights the 
imperatives of strengthening, in order to avoid a future policy 
vacuum, the transnational effectiveness of UK policies in 
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addressing the increasing cases of people who go missing while 
attempting to reach international destinations. 
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The phenomenon of missing migrants1 poses exceptional challenges for 
states, affected families, and the international community as a whole 
for many reasons. The first challenge is migration’s transnational 
scale—involving a large number of irregular migrants from origin 
countries crossing the high sea and state borders in a desperate 
attempt to enter transit and destination countries.2 Second is  the 
immense cost3 and other practical challenges involved in search, 
investigation, identification,4 and repatriation of dead migrants to 
their families. And third is the apparent transnational ineffectiveness 
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1. See Her Majesty Queen Noor, ICMP Commissioner, Speech at the Hague 
Conference: Missing Persons: An Agenda for the Future (Oct. 29, 2013) (“When we speak 
of a missing person, we mean someone being missed by others. It is those that remain 
who experience the anguish of uncertainty . . . [and who] turn to state authorities for 
answers . . . .”). 
2. See Gabriella Citroni, The First Attempts in Mexico and Central America to 
Address the Phenomenon of Missing and Disappeared Migrants, 99 INT’L REV. RED 
CROSS 735, 737 (2017). 
3. On challenges with high cost of repatriation of migrant remains, see Ruairi 
Connolly, Richard Prendiville, Denis Cusack & Gerard Flaherty, Repatriation of Human 
Remains Following Deaths in International Travellers, 24 J. TRAVEL MED. 1, 4 (2017). 
On the cost of rescue of migrants at sea, see David Miller, Our Responsibilities to 
Refugees, in STUDYING MIGRATION POLICIES AT THE INTERFACE BETWEEN EMPIRICAL 
RESEARCH AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS 37, 46 (Matthias Hoesch & Lena Laube eds., 2018). 
4. See generally Lara Olivieria, Debora Mazzarelli, Barbara Bertoglio, Danilo 
De Angelis, Carlo Previderè, Pierangela Grignani, Annalisa Cappella, Silvano 
Presciuttini, Caterina Bertuglia, Paola Di Simone, Nicolò Polizzi, Agata Iadicicco, 
Vittorio Piscitelli & Cristina Cattaneo, Challenges in the Identification of Dead Migrants 
in the Mediterranean: The Case Study of the Lampedusa Shipwreck of October 3rd 2013, 
285 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 121 (2018). 
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of national migration policies in response to the problem. Migrants 
mostly go missing at sea and EU external borders when they attempt 
to escape from war and generalised violence, repressive regimes, 
systematic human rights abuses, etc.5 The UNCHR estimates that 
worldwide, by the end of 2018, more than 70.8 million people around 
the world were forced to flee their homes as a result of persecution, 
violence, conflicts, or human rights abuses, out of which 25.9 million 
were refugees.6 Most of the migrants are fleeing armed conflict7 in the 
Middle East, mainly the Syrian civil war,8  and also armed conflicts in 
different parts of Africa,9 mainly those sparked by the Arab spring 
uprisings10 and regime crisis in the Horn of Africa and Libya.11 
Generally, over the last three decades, international migration has 
increased at an unprecedented level; far more than E.G. Ravenstein, 
widely believed to be principal pioneer of migration studies, could have 
imagined in 1885.12 In 2010, it was estimated that around 214 million 
people (representing 3.1 percent of the total global population)13 
resided outside their home countries,14 an increase of 35 million from 
 
5. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE MEDITERRANEAN MIGRATION CRISIS: WHY 
PEOPLE FLEE, WHAT THE EU SHOULD DO 2–3 (2015). 
6. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, GLOBAL TRENDS: 
FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2018 2 (2019). 
7. See generally Vanessa Holzer, The 1951 Convention and the Protection of 
People Fleeing Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence (U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, Switzerland, Legal & Prot. Pol’y Rsch Series, 2012). 
8. See George J. Somi, Syria Under Pinheiro: Reformulating Syrian Domestic 
Law for Decentralized Reconstruction, 43 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 717, 717 (2018) (stating that 
between 2011 and 2018, the Syrian conflict produced roughly 5.4 million refugees).  
9. See Helen Obregón Gieseken, The Protection of Migrants Under International 
Humanitarian Law, 99 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 121, 122 (2017); Marion Panizzon & 
Micheline van Riemsdijk, Introduction to Special Issue: Migration Governance in an Era 
of Large Movements: A Multi-level Approach, 45 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 1225, 
1225 (2019). 
10. For detailed analysis of the impact of the Arab Spring uprising on migration 
to Europe, see MARTINA TAZZIOLI, SPACES OF GOVERNMENTALITY: AUTONOMOUS 
MIGRATION AND THE ARAB UPRISINGS 1–33 (2014). 
11. See PUBLICATIONS OFFICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE EU AND THE 
MIGRATION CRISIS (2017), https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/e9465e4f-b2e4-11e7-837e-01aa75ed71a1 [https://perma.cc/EKE8-SYUM]; 
CHRISTINE AGHAZARM, PATRICE QUESADA & SARAH TISHLER, MIGRANTS CAUGHT IN 
CRISIS: THE IOM EXPERIENCE IN LIBYA 5 (Olga Sheean ed., 2012), 
https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/migrationcaughtincrisis_forweb.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/WCX9-8QDM] (archived Jan. 21, 2021). 
12. See generally E. G. Ravenstein, The Laws of Migration, 48 J. STAT. SOC’Y 
LONDON 167 (1885) (pt. I); E. G. Ravenstein, The Laws of Migration, 52 J. STAT. SOC’Y 
LONDON 241 (1889) (pt. II). 
13. See U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, International Migration Rep. 2009: A 
Global Assessment, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/316, at 1 (2011). 
14. See PIA OBEROI, JUANA SOTOMAYOR, PAOLA PACE, BARBARA RIJKS, 
JACQUELINE WEEKERS & YEHENEW TESGAYE WALILEGNE, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION [IOM], INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, HEALTH AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 11 (2013), https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iom_unhchr_en_web.pdf 
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2000 and 58 million since 1990.15 In 2017, the number reached 258 
million, up from 248 million in 2015 and 191 million in 2005.16 With 
the number hitting 272 million in 2020,17 it is now estimated that if 
migration continues at the same rate as it has been in the last 20 years, 
the number could be as high as 405 million by 2050.18 Thus, migrant 
and refugee flows across external borders of states are not a new 
phenomenon.19 They constitute a “significant feature of political life in 
Western liberal democracies”20 and are likely to increase both in scope, 
complexity, and impact.21 Migrants move in search of food to survive 
and also to escape violence, threats to life, and possible death.22 In 
many cases, states of departure are either unwilling or genuinely 
unable to offer protection.23 Transit and receiving states too, often 
refrain from tackling the problem until migrants reach their 
territory.24 They sometimes deny that they have obligations to deal 
with cases of migrants reported missing in transnational migration.25 
 
[https://perma.cc/L6C2-P3L8]; cf. Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rts. 
[OHCHR], Migration, Human Rights and Governance, at 17 (2015), 
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationr
eport/docs/MigrationReport2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/6K7K-6PG7]. 
15. See International Migration Rep. 2009: A Global Assessment, supra note 13, 
at 1–7. 
16. U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, International Migration Rep. 2017: 
Highlights, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/404, at 4 (2017).  
17. IOM, WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2020 10 (2019), https://publications.
iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TXH-439N] (archived Mar. 15, 
2021). 
18. INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 14, at 
13. 
19. Migration stretches back to the earliest periods of human history. See IOM, 
WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2018 13 (2017), https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/
country/docs/china/r5_world_migration_report_2018_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JT6-CR
NR] (archived Jan. 22, 2021); KHALID KOSER, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: A VERY SHORT 
INTRODUCTION 1 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007); Fatahi Nabi, The Impact of Migration on 
Psychosocial Well-Being: A Study of Kurdish Refugees in a Resettlement Country, 4 J. 
COMMUNITY MED. & HEALTH EDUC. 1, 1 (2014). 
20. David Miller, Immigrants, Nations, and Citizenship, 16 J. POL. PHIL. 371, 371 
(2008). 
21. See, e.g., U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, EXPERT SYMPOSIUM ON 
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT (2019), https://www.un.
org/en/development/desa/population/migration/events/other/symposium/201902/index.a
sp  [https://perma.cc/9RT8-P3DE] (archived Jan. 21, 2021); cf. Mathias Czaika & Hein 
de Haas, The Globalisation of Migration: Has the World Become More Migratory?, 48 
INT’L MIGRATION REV. 283, 283–84 (2015). 
22. See Lynette M. Parker, The Ethics of Migration and Immigration: Key 
Questions for Policy Makers, MARKKULA CTR. FOR APPLIED ETHICS AT SANTA CLARA 
UNIV. (May 1, 2007), https://www.scu.edu/ethics/focus-areas/more/resources/the-ethics-
of-migration-and-immigration/ [https://perma.cc/R2YC-4X8V] (Jan. 21, 2021). 
23. See Vassilis P. Tzevelekos & Elena Katselli Proukaki, Migrants at Sea: A Duty 
of Plural States to Protect Extraterritorially, 86 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 427, 428 (2017). 
24. See id. 
25. See generally Simon Robins, Missing in Migration: From Research to Practice, 
40 PRACTICING ANTHROPOLOGY 24 (2018) [hereinafter Robins, Missing in Migration]. 
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Such conflicting claims raise serious questions about migration policies 
and governance and how the problem of missing migrants should be 
dealt with at the international level. The newly adopted United 
Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration 
(GCM) answers a part of the question by recognising that migration 
generally, and missing migrants specifically, is a transnational social 
problem which requires greater cooperation amongst states as well as 
policies with transnational effects.26 Such declaration in the GCM 
echoes the sentiments of transnational law, which advocates that 
transnational social problems that transcend national frontiers, such 
as migration, must be tackled through a transnational legal and policy 
response and approach.27 The United Kingdom was one of the earliest 
countries to endorse the new GCM, hinting that it respects national 
sovereignty and the inherent right of sovereign states to determine and 
implement their own national migration policies and protect their 
national interest.28 A petition backed by the UK Independence Party 
(UKIP)29 to the House of Commons against the country’s accession to 
the GCM had attracted 131,617 signatures in 2018.30 The government 
however argued that the GCM will “support global co-operation on 
migration without affecting the sovereignty of all countries to control 
their own borders.”31 
 Given the significance of the United Kingdom’s commitment to the 
GCM, this Article asks if the UK policy in relation to missing migrants 
is transnationally effective, such as to facilitate implementation of the 
GCM and other relevant international legal instruments nationally. 
Adopting a transnational law approach, this Article unfolds in the 
following six sections: Part I first highlights the problem of missing 
migrants in light of transnational law. It is argued that the problem of 
missing migrants is a transnational legal and policy issue that requires 
a transnational response from states. Such a response would require 
adoption of a transnationally effective national migration policy. But 
 
26. See Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, ¶ 24(a)–(f), July 
13, 2018, https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/180713_agreed_outcome
_global_compact_for_migration.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZ22-BDAJ] (archived Jan. 21, 
2021) (Objective 8(a)–(f)).  
27. See Harold Hongju Koh, Is There a “New” New Haven School of International 
Law?, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 559, 564 (2007). 
28. See STEFANO FELLA, BRIEFING PAPER ON THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL 
COMPACT FOR MIGRATION 24–25 (House of Commons Library 2019), 
https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8459/CBP-8459.pdf [https
://perma.cc/5GPZ-VR8M] (archived Jan. 21, 2021). 
29. See id. at 20. 
30. See The UK Should Not Agree the UN’s Global Compact for Migration, 
UNITED KINGDOM GOV’T & PARLIAMENT (2018), https://petition.parliament.uk/archived/
petitions/232698 [https://perma.cc/XNF2-47XL] (archived Mar. 15, 2021) (arguing that 
United Kingdom’s accession to the GCM “will make illegal migration legal and make it 
a human right”). 
31. FELLA, supra note 28, at 21. 
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what constitutes a transnationally effective national migration policy 
in relation to missing migrants is largely undefined in the literature. 
Therefore, this Article proceeds in Part II to define what is meant by a 
transnationally effective national migration policy. It then considers, 
in general, the policy responses to the problem of missing migrants 
first at the EU level (Part III) and then at the UK level (Part IV), 
bearing in mind that the UK policy approach draws more broadly from 
the wider EU policy perspectives on transnational migration. It then 
proceeds in Part V to provide the wider justification for the argument 
for adoption of a transnationally effective national migration policy to 
address the problem of missing migrants. Part VI considers the 
relevant provisions of the GCM relating to missing migrants and what 
obligations the United Kingdom has to implement the GCM in a 
transnationally effective way. It then proceeds to consider the interface 
between the legal and moral dimensions of the obligations of states 
towards migrants given that the benefits of such interface will prove 
critical when evaluating the transnational effectiveness of state 
migration policies in relation to missing migrants. Existing evidence in 
the literature shows limited knowledge about the transnational effects 
of the UK policies in relation to missing migrants. Therefore, this 
Article, in its concluding part, highlights the imperatives of 
strengthening, in order to avoid a future policy vacuum, the 
transnational effectiveness of UK policies in addressing the increasing 
cases of people who go missing while attempting to reach international 
destinations. 
II. TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND THE TRANSNATIONAL PROBLEM OF 
MISSING MIGRANTS 
 Transnational legal problems are rarely amenable to simple 
solutions, not least when a legal subject is missing in migration. When 
Philip Jessup, in his 1955 influential Storrs Lectures at the Yale Law 
School, articulated and proposed the term “transnational law” to 
“include all law which regulates actions or events that transcend 
national frontiers,”32 cross-border irregular migration leading to 
deaths and human disappearances at sea, deserts, borders, and other 
fragmented spaces must have been one of those transnational events 
that was high on his thoughts and agenda.33 Jessup’s transnational 
 
32. PHILIP JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 219 (Yale Univ. Press 1956). See 
generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why and How to Study Transnational Law, 1 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 97 (2011). 
33. See E. Tendayi Achiume, The Fatal Flaw in International Law for Migration, 
56 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 257, 257 (2018) (arguing that the transnational problem of 
irregular migration across the sea to Europe is one that demonstrates the need to reform 
the current global governance of international migration). 
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law theory recognises that externalized domestic laws and policies of 
states enforced abroad, beyond national frontiers, can at times impact 
a state’s population in more influential ways than when those laws and 
policies are enforced strictly within national legal orders. One typical 
example of where national policies can produce transnational effects is 
irregular migration. Not least because states are increasingly adopting 
externalized migration policies in response to large unauthorized 
migrant flows into their territories. The adoption and implementation 
of extra territorialized migration policies and procedures by states in 
response to migrant movements clearly indicate that migrant and 
refugee flows across seas and borders of states are transnational legal 
and policy issues that go right to the heart of any normative discussion 
of transnationalism.34 This is so because the aspiration of irregular 
migrants to reach the territories of states in search of safety and better 
life is itself a transnational activity.35 And international migration that 
involves migrants crossing the borders of states is itself a transnational 
process.36 A broader diagnosis of the legal, policy, and practical 
problem of missing migrants will unveil its transnational dimension. 
First, with the high seas left wide open, migration journeys have seen 
several thousands of migrants die while making the deadly sea 
crossings and thousands more remain missing as a result. The 
watershed moment came in October 2013 when a boat carrying around 
500 migrants capsized off the Italian Island of Lampedusa, killing at 
least 366 of the migrants on board.37 This tragic incident marked a 
turning point in what has become known as the “European Migrant 
Crisis,”38 marked by increased deaths at sea. The chilling images of 
 
34. See Itamar Mann, Dialectic of Transnationalism: Unauthorised Migration 
and Human Rights, 1993-2013, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 315, 316, 322, 327 (2013) [hereinafter 
Mann, Dialectic] (arguing that unauthorised migrants and refugees are “an increasingly 
contentious and paradigmatically transnational policy issue”). 
35. Masja Van Meeteren, Transnational Activities and Aspiration of Irregular 
Migrants in Belgium and the Netherlands, 12 GLOB. NETWORKS 314, 314–32 (2012). 
36. See Alexander Betts, Policy Primer: The UK and Global Migration 
Governance, MIGRATION OBSERVATORY UNIV. OXFORD, Mar. 29, 2011, at 6, 
https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PolicyPrimer-Global
_Governance.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/5R9M-STX5]  (archived 
Jan. 12, 2021) [hereinafter Betts, Policy Primer]. 
37. See Marie Martin, Prioritising Border Control Over Human Lives: Violations 
of the Rights of Migrants and Refugees at Sea, EURO-MEDITERRANEAN HUM. RTS. 
NETWORK POL’Y BRIEF, June 2014, at 1; J. Coppens, The Lampedusa Disaster: How to 
Prevent Further Loss of Life at Sea, 7 INT’L J. MARINE NAVIGATION & SAFETY SEA 
TRANSP. 589, 589–95 (2013). 
38. For more on the migrant crisis in the EU context, see Eugene Quinn, The 
Refugee and Migrant Crisis: Europe’s Challenge, 105 IRISH Q. REV. 275, 275–85 (2016); 
see also Michael Collyer & Russell King, Narrating Europe’s Migration and Refugee 
‘Crisis,’ 9 HUM. GEOGRAPHY, no. 2, 2016, at 1, 1–10; Heaven Crawley, Managing the 
Unmanageable? Understanding Europe’s Response to the Migration ‘Crisis,’ 9 HUM. 
GEOGRAPHY, no. 2, 2016, at 13, 13–21; Philip L. Martin, Europe’s Migration Crisis: An 
American Perspective, 13 MIGRATION LETTERS 307, 307–19 (2016); Martin Baldwin-
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desperate and stranded migrants making perilous journeys through 
the Mediterranean Sea in those periods and afterwards have 
particularly shocked the conscience of humanity and attracted 
worldwide media coverage.39 The unseaworthy and overcrowded boats 
packed with young people, women, and children seeking safety sink in 
deadly shipwrecks.40 Yet, many more die of severe weather exposure, 
dehydration, hypothermia, or other kinds of illness, injury, suicide, 
murder, violent attacks, accidents, or medical complications during 
their journeys.41 The damning data of migrant mortalities recorded by 
the UNCHR,42 IOM,43 and FRONTEX44 and related authorities, in 
 
Edwards, Brad K. Blitz & Heaven Crawley, The Politics of Evidence-Based Policy in 
Europe’s ‘Migration Crisis,’ 45 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 2139, 2139–55 (2019); 
Europe’s Migrant Crisis: A Comprehensive Analysis, MIGRATION RSCH. INST. (Jan. 2016); 
Migration Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts, BBC NEWS (Mar. 4, 
2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911 [https://perma.cc/2YB8-
67WG] (archived Jan. 21, 2021). 
39. See, e.g., Aidan White & Ann Singleton, Mixed Messages: Media Coverage of 
Migration and Fatalities, in 3 FATAL JOURNEYS: IMPROVING DATA ON MISSING MIGRANTS 
47, 47–60 (Frank Laczko, Ann Singleton & Julia Black eds., IOM 2017); Kerry Moore, 
Mike Berry & Inaki Garcia-Blanco, Saving Refugees or Policing the Sea? How the 
National Press of Five EU Member States Framed News Coverage of the Migration Crisis, 
2 JUST., POWER & RESISTANCE 66, 67 (2018). See generally MIKE BERRY, INAKI GARCIA-
BLANCO & KERRY MOORE, PRESS COVERAGE OF THE REFUGEE AND MIGRANT CRISIS IN 
THE EU: A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF FIVE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (2015); MYRIA GEORGIOU 
& RAFAL ZABOROWSKI, MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE “REFUGEE CRISIS”: A CROSS-EUROPEAN 
PERSPECTIVE (2017). 
40. See Tamara Last & Thomas Spijkerboer, Tracking Deaths in the 
Mediterranean, in FATAL JOURNEYS: TRACKING LIVES LOST DURING MIGRATION 85, 96 
(Tara Brian & Frack Laczko eds., 2014). 
41. See Williams Lacy Swing, Foreword to FATAL JOURNEYS: TRACKING LIVES 
LOST DURING MIGRATION, supra note 40, at 5, 5. 
42. See United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees [UNHCR], Operational Portal: 
Refugee Situations: Mediterranean Situation, UNHCR, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/
situations/mediterranean (last visited Jan. 19, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8ZGB-7RX3] 
(archived Jan. 19, 2021); UNHCR, Operational Portal: Refugee Situations: Europe Dead 
and Missing at Sea, UNHCR (Jan. 19, 2021), https://data2.unhcr.org/
en/dataviz/95?sv=0&geo=0 [https://perma.cc/S5VD-9MX7] (archived Jan. 19, 2021); see 
also UNHCR, REFUGEE & MIGRANT ARRIVALS TO EUROPE IN 2019 (MEDITERRANEAN) 
(2019), https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/72161 (last visited Jan. 19, 
2021) [https://perma.cc/E7RN-PWV4] (archived Jan. 19, 2021). 
43. See IOM, Missing Migrants: Total of Deaths Record in Mediterranean from 01 
January to 19 January, IOM (2021), https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/
mediterranean (last visited Jan. 19, 2021) [https://perma.cc/GD77-4F9V] (archived Jan. 
19, 2021); IOM, Flow Monitoring Europe: Arrivals, IOM, https://migration.
iom.int/europe?type=arrivals (last visited Jan. 19, 2021) [https://perma.cc/73SS-DMTG] 
(archived Jan. 19, 2021). 
44. FRONTEX Risk Analysis Data is based on its own detections of illegal 
migrant crossings into the EU through sea and land routes. For the risk data analysis of 
Frontex for the years 2016 and 2019, see FRONTEX, RISK ANALYSIS FOR 2019 (Feb. 
2019), https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Risk_Analysis/Risk
_Analysis_for_2019.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2021) [https://perma.cc/U8KA-J43Z] 
(archived Jan. 19, 2021); FRONTEX, RISK ANALYSIS FOR 2016 (Mar. 2016), 
https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annula_Risk_Analysis_201
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particular, those of “United Against Refugee Deaths,”45 “Fortress 
Europe Blog,”46 “Deaths at the Borders Database,”47 “Migrants’ 
Files,”48 “List of Deaths,”49 “Watch The Med Initiative,”50 “Mixed 
 
6.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2021) [https://perma.cc/XM5N-WP4F] (archived Jan. 19, 
2021). 
45. UNITED Against Refugee Deaths is a European network against 
nationalism, racism, and fascism and in support of migrants and refugees that has been 
recording data on migrant deaths since 1993. See The Fatal Policies of Fortress Europe, 
UNITED AGAINST REFUGEE DEATHS, http://unitedagainstrefugeedeaths.eu/ (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/5DYK-E2YK] (archived Jan. 20, 2021). 
46. Fortress Europe Blog, operated by Fortress Europe, provides data and 
information generated from the media on the location, date and cause of death of 
migrants. Its operation lasted from 1988 to February 2016. For details, see Fortress 
Europe. English Edition, FORTRESS EUROPE (May 1, 2014), 
http://fortresseurope.blogspot.com/2006/02/immigrants-dead-at-frontiers-of-europe_16.
html [https://perma.cc/RAY3-8J7Q] (archived Jan. 20, 2021). 
47. Death at the Borders Database, operated by Vrije University Amsterdam, 
provides data and information on the location, date, nationality, gender, age and cause 
of migrant deaths. Their data is derived primary from death certificates and official 
records. The organization operated from 1990 to 2013. For details, see Deaths at the 
Borders of Southern Europe, VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT AMSTERDAM (2021), 
http://www.borderdeaths.org/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/SUN4-VM6J] 
(archived Jan. 20, 2021). 
48. The Migrants’ Files, operated by various media organisations, records data 
and information on the location, date and cause of migrant deaths. Its operation lasted 
from 2000 to June 2016. For details, see MIGRANTS’ FILES, http://
www.themigrantsfiles.com/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/9AWP-BPX6] 
(archived Jan. 20, 2021). 
49. List of Deaths, operated by an organisation called UNITED for Intercultural 
Action, provides data and information on the location, date, cause of death and 
nationality (if available) of migrants. Its data recording is derived primary from the 
media. Its operation lasted from 1993-2015. For details, see List of 36,570 Documented 
Deaths of Refugees and Migrants Due to the Restrictive Policies of “Fortress Europe,” 
UNITED FOR INTERCULTURAL ACTION (Apr. 1, 2019), http://www.united
againstracism.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/ListofDeathsActual.pdf (last visited Jan. 
20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/3CCQ-2WEA] (archived Jan. 20, 2021); The Fatal Policies of 
Fortress Europe, UNITED FOR INTERCULTURAL ACTION, http://www.unitedagainstracism.
org/campaigns/refugee-campaign/fortress-europe/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/QBL5-Z27J] (archived Jan. 20, 2021). 
50. Watch the Mediterranean Sea (“Watch the Med” for short) is an online 
mapping platform and observatory of the EU maritime borders set up to monitor deaths 
and violations of migrants’ rights at the maritime borders of the EU. It was initiated as 
part of the 2012 Boat4People Campaign in the central Mediterranean and involves a 
wide network of organisations, activists and researchers. See WatchTheMed Alarm 
Phone Reports, WATCH THE MED, https://watchthemed.net/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/UA73-A2AF] (archived Jan. 21, 2021); Interview: WatchTheMed Alarm 
Phone: A Response for Rescue and a Call for Change, EUR. COUNCIL ON REFUGEES & 
EXILES (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.ecre.org/interview-watchthemed-alarm-phone-a-
response-for-rescue-and-a-call-for-change/ [https://perma.cc/277B-WLYM] (archived 
Jan. 21, 2021); Safety at Sea, WATCH THE MED, https://watchthemed.net/
index.php/page/index/10 (last visited Jan. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/6HCT-VALN] 
(archived Jan. 21, 2021); see also Stephan Liebscher & Ina Fisher, Mapping Safe 
Passages: Real-Time Interventions at the Maritime Borders of Europe, in THIS IS NOT AN 
ATLAS 60 (Kollektiv Orangotango ed., 2018); Maurice Stierl, The WatchTheMed Alarm 
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Migration Monitoring Mechanism Initiative (4Mi),”51 and similar 
initiatives outside Europe52 all point to the transnational magnitude 
of the problem.  
 These figures on migrant mortalities all underline the 
humanitarian imperatives of tackling migrant deaths and 
disappearances at sea and borders whilst also facilitating the search, 
investigation, identification, and repatriation of those already reported 
dead to their families.53 And now, with the recent outbreak of the 
COVID-19 pandemic marked by increased border closures, city 
lockdowns, and tightened immigration measures across the world,54 
experts fear that a significant number of migrants trapped in COVID-
19 hotspots across European borderlines face real threats to their 
security, health, dignity, and survival,55 and could compound families’ 
 
Phone: A Disobedient Border Intervention, 1 J. FOR CRITICAL MIGRATION & BORDER 
REGIME STUD., no. 2, 2015, at 1, 1–15. 
51. The “Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism Initiative (4Mi)” conducts 
structured interviews with migrants and refugees along various migration routes 
globally especially those originating from North Africa to Europe. See 4Mi, MIXED 
MIGRATION CTR. (2021), http://www.mixedmigration.org/4mi/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/Z4W6-P5GY] (archived Jan. 20, 2021). 
52. In addition to these initiatives/projects documenting migrant deaths and 
other migration issues within the European frontiers, compare also similar projects that 
documents migrant fatalities in other regions such as: “The Australian Border Deaths 
Database.” See Australian Border Deaths Database, MONASH UNIV. (2021)., 
https://www.monash.edu/arts/border-crossing-observatory/research-agenda/australian-
border-deaths-database (last visited Jan. 20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/WHD8-ZPAB] 
(archived Jan. 20, 2021) (maintaining a record of all known deaths associated with 
Australian borders since January 2000); Migrant Death Mapping, HUMANE BORDERS 
FRONTERAS COMPASIVAS (2021), https://humaneborders.org/migrant-death-mapping/ 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/6RMB-2BKB] (archived Jan. 20, 2021) 
(created by Humane Borders, a non-profit organisation to track where each migrant body 
was found on the US-Mexico border, name and gender of the deceased, and the cause of 
deaths).  
53. See generally Dead and Missing at Sea:Informative Guide for Families and 
their Supporters, LACIMADE (2017), https://www.lacimade.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2017/05/Cim.B4P.Familles-ANG.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2021) [https://
perma.cc/Z694-5W4A] (archived Jan. 20, 2021) (discussing the procedure in Italy for 
search, investigation, identification and repatriation of migrant bodies to their families). 
54. For example, recently Italy in response to the COVID-19 outbreak passed a 
law it called “Inter-Ministerial Decree n. 150 of 7 April 2020” which is targeted at 
preventing migrants rescued by NGO vessels flying non-Italian flag from landing at Italy 
ports. See Andrea Maria Pelliconi, COVID-19: Italy is Not a “Place of Safety” Anymore. 
Is the Decision to Close Italian Ports Compliant with Human Rights Obligations?, 
EJIL:TALK! (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/covid-19-italy-is-not-a-place-of-
safety-anymore-is-the-decision-to-close-italian-ports-compliant-with-human-rights-obli
gations/ [https://perma.cc/EBV8-KH5B] (archived Jan. 20, 2021). 
55. See Lorenzo Guadagno, Migrants and the COVID-19 Pandemic: An Initial 
Analysis, IOM MIGRATION RESEARCH SERIES, no. 60, 2020, at 3, 9; see also Erol Yayboke, 
Five Ways COVID-19 is Changing Global Migration, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. 
(Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/five-ways-covid-19-changing-global-
migration [https://perma.cc/Y7D6-E7DB] (archived Jan. 21, 2021); Erol Yayboke & 
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Seeking a Path to Europe, Refugees and Migrants Ultimately 
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search for their missing relatives.56 The humanitarian crisis of missing 
migrants, thus, remains a pressing transnational social problem with 
vast areas of conflicting interests for governments, individuals, 
families, communities, and international organisations. Yet, relatively 
little is known about migrants who go missing at sea and across 
borders, what happens to them while they are missing, and in what 
ways their deaths or disappearances can be prevented.57 Missing 
 
Turned Back by COVID-19, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Apr. 2, 2020), 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/seeking-path-europe-refugees-and-migrants-ultimately-tu
rned-back-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/8VDZ-U8TX] (archived Jan. 21, 2021); Priya Pillai, 
COVID-19 Symposium: COVID-19 and Migrants—Gaps in the International Legal 
Architecture?, OPINIOJURIS (Apr. 4, 2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020/04/04/covid-19-
symposium-covid-19-and-migrants-gaps-in-the-international-legal-architecture/ [https:
//perma.cc/N6JG-93XE] (archived Jan. 21, 2021) (arguing that the current outbreak of 
the COVID-19 pandemic has further exposed the protection gaps in the existing 
international legal frameworks designed to protect migrants); León Castellanos-
Jankiewicz, COVID-19 Symposium: US Border Closure Breaches International Refugee 
Law, OPINIOJURIS (Mar. 4, 2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020/04/03/covid-19-symposium-
us-border-closure-breaches-international-refugee-law/ [https://perma.cc/R8FT-7WFF] 
(archived Jan. 21, 2021) (arguing that the unprecedented measures marked by border 
crackdown adopted by global states especially the Trump administration in response to 
the COVID-19 pandemic is putting migrants in the harm’s way and they stand a real 
“severe risk of kidnapping, torture, rape, and, ultimately, death”). 
56. See Marta Sánchez Dionis, Kate Dearden & Gabriella Sanchez, COVID-19 
Compounds Families’ Painful Search for Missing and Disappeared Migrants,  
RELIEFWEB (June 24, 2020), https://reliefweb.int/report/world/covid-19-compounds-
families-painful-search-missing-and-disappeared-migrants [https://perma.cc/Y8YL-SC
C7] (archived Jan. 21, 2021). 
57. However, academic research has recently taken steps to address the problem, 
in particular, the Mediterranean Missing Migrants project carried out by UK academics 
at the forefront of work on the issue of missing migrants in collaboration with the leading 
international organisation (IOM) working on the issue. See, e.g., MEDITERRANEAN 
MISSING PROJECT, MISSING MIGRANTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: ADDRESSING THE 
HUMANITARIAN CRISIS 1–14 (Sept. 2016); MEDITERRANEAN MISSING PROJECT, ‘LIKE A 
PART OF A PUZZLE WHICH IS MISSING’: THE IMPACT ON FAMILIES OF A RELATIVE MISSING 
IN MIGRATION ACROSS THE MEDITERRANEAN 2–13 (Sept. 2016); MEDITERRANEAN 
MISSING PROJECT, MISSING MIGRANTS: MANAGEMENT OF DEAD BODIES IN SICILY (2016), 
https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/17795/1/Report-on-Missing-Migrants-in-Italy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4KWB-23FB]  (archived Feb. 1, 2021); MEDITERRANEAN MISSING 
PROJECT ESRC, MISSING MIGRANTS: MANAGEMENT OF DEAD BODIES IN LESBOS 2–10, 
(2016); STEPHANIE GRANT, DEAD AND MISSING MIGRANTS: THE OBLIGATIONS OF 
EUROPEAN STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 4, 6–16 (2016), 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Mediterranean-Missing-Legal-Me
mo-290816.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PZP-2RGQ] (archived Jan. 23, 2021); VASSILIS 
KERASIOTIS & MARIA SPILIOTAKARA, MISSING AND DEAD MIGRANTS AT SEA: THE LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK IN GREECE, GREECE 1, 4–11 (2016); SERENA ROMANO, THE ITALIAN LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF MISSING PERSONS AND UNIDENTIFIED DEAD 
BODIES, AND THE RIGHTS OF THE RELATIVES 1, 4–15 (2016); MEDITERRANEAN MISSING 
PROJECT, MISSING MIGRANTS AND MANAGING DEAD BODIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1–4 
(2016); see also Simons Robins, Anna Vallianatou & Iosif Kovras, Missing Migrants and 
Deaths at EU’s Mediterranean Border: Humanitarian Needs and State Obligations, UK 
RES. & INNOVATION, https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FN01345X%2F1#/tab
Overview (last visited Jan. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/223G-TZ9C] (archived Jan. 21, 
2021); Ottavia Ampuero Villagran, Identifying Migrant Bodies in the Mediterranean, 5 
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migrants are defined using the fact that their families do not have any 
knowledge about the fates of their missing relatives, or whether they 
are alive or dead.58 In principle, the Article refers to seven categories 
of people as missing “migrants": 
 
 (1)  migrants who died and their bodies were never recovered;  
 (2)  migrants who died and their bodies were actually recovered 
but no identification was possible due to advanced decomposed state of 
the dead bodies (the benefits of possible identification through forensic 
ante-mortem data notwithstanding);  
 (3)  migrants who died but were buried in unmarked graves with 
no proper identification from any source—families, friends, or 
governmental authorities—and, as a result, who they are or where they 
came from remain unknown;  
 (4)  migrants who are actually alive but who cannot be found 
because they lost their way either before, during, or so soon after the 
completion of their journeys, including “unaccompanied children”;59  
 (5)  migrants who went missing due to the actions of others (e.g., 
migrants who are victims of human trafficking, robbery, migrant 
smuggling, abductions, or homicide);60  
 (6)  migrants who may have been arrested and detained without 
access to means of communication, insofar as the circumstances of 
their detention remain unknown to their relatives followed by a denial 
 
U.N. UNIV. POL’Y REP., no. 2, 2018, at 1, 5–10; Amade M’charek & Sara Casarelli, 
Identifying Dead Migrants: Forensic Care Work and Relational Citizenship, 23 
CITIZENSHIP STUD., Aug. 7, 2019, at 738; Simon Robins, Migrant Bodies in Europe: 
Routes to Identifying the Dead and Addressing the Needs of the Families of the Missing, 
in 3 FATAL JOURNEYS, supra note 39, at 64–65 [hereinafter Robins, Migrant Bodies]; 
Stephanie Grant, Identification and Tracing, in 2 FATAL JOURNEYS: IDENTIFICATION AND 
TRACING OF DEAD AND MISSING MIGRANTS 31, 37–51 (Tara Brian & Frank Laczko eds., 
2016); Catriona Jarvis, Last Right: Cross-Border Deaths—Towards a New Framework, 
31 J. IMMIGR., ASYLUM & NAT’Y L. 131, 131–50 (2017); CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS [CSHR], CROSS-BORDER DEATHS ON THE JOURNEY TO EUROPE: TOWARDS A LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 3 (2016). 
58. See Stephanie Grant, Migrant and Refugee Border Deaths: Defining A Human 
Rights Framework, 3 LSE L. REV. 129, 129 (2018); see also Iosif Kovras & Simon Robins, 
Death as the Border: Managing Missing Migrants and Unidentified Bodies at the EU’s 
Mediterranean Frontier, 55 POL. GEOGRAPHY 40, 41 (2016).  
59. For detailed study on obligations of states with regard to child migrant deaths 
and disappearances, see Jacqueline Bhabha, Legal Obligations of States with Regard to 
Child Migrant Death and Disappearances, in 4 FATAL JOURNEYS: MISSING MIGRANT 
CHILDREN 73, 73–83 (Frank Laczko, Julia Black & Ann Singleton eds., 2019); see also 
Delphine Morales, Presentation at the 3rd International Conference on Missing Children 
and Adults: Missing Children in Migration: Findings from European Research (June 15, 
2017); Eur. Consult. Ass., Missing Refugee and Migrant Children in Europe, Doc. No. 
15026 (Jan. 7, 2020) (recognising that child migrants are particularly vulnerable to going 
missing). 
60. See generally Inter-American Comm’n on Human Rights [IACHR], Human 
Rights of Migrants and Other Persons in the Context of Human Mobility in Mexico, at 
50–69, OEA/Ser.L/V/II Doc. 48/13 (Dec. 30, 2013).  
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of such detention by state authorities (enforced disappearance);61 and, 
finally, 
 (7)  migrants who may have entered the territory of a particular 
state through irregular channels and, therefore, choose as a safety 
precaution to remain missing and avoid detection by state and 
immigration authorities.62 
 
 Worldwide, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 
estimates that, since the year 2000, at least forty thousand migrants 
have died while making the risky journeys.63 A recent report puts the 
figure at more than sixty thousand deaths since 2000.64 Out of these 
figures, more than 18,500 are believed to have died crossing the 
Mediterranean since 2014,65 with the latest IOM data putting the 
 
61. For detailed discussion on enforced disappearances in the context of 
migration, see Ariel E. Dulitzky, The Latin-American Flavor of Enforced 
Disappearances, 19 CHI. J. INT’L L. 423, 429–38  (2019); INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 
(ICRC), MISSING MIGRANTS AND THEIR FAMILIES: THE ICRC’S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
POLICY-MAKERS 4 (2017),  https://www.refworld.org/docid/59c3c2c54.html [https://
perma.cc/GHJ5-DQKD] (archived Mar. 15, 2021) (stating that migrants often go and 
subsequently remain missing in migration when they are detained without access to 
means of communication); see also Emilio Distretti, Enforced Disappearances and Border 
Deaths Along the Migrant Trail, in BORDER DEATHS: CAUSES, DYNAMICS AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF MIGRATION-RELATED MORTALITY 117, 117–27  (Paolo Cuttitta & 
Tamara Last eds., Amsterdam Univ. Press 2020). See generally G.A. Res. 61/177 (Dec. 
20, 2006).  
62. In the UK, the practice is usually that if a migrant reported missing is an 
adult, it should first be determined whether the person in question entered the country 
illegally and is deliberately evading state and immigration authorities as a safety 
precaution. In that case, pending conclusion of investigation by the police in 
collaboration with other responsible agencies—mainly the UK Border Agency—the 
migrant/asylum seeker is first declared a “wanted person” before they are considered 
“missing”. But if the migrant/asylum seeker is a child, they are declared “missing” ab 
initio and it is immaterial that the child is believed to be in company of an adult, e.g., 
children who are victims of human trafficking. See generally NATIONAL POLICING 
IMPROVEMENT AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON THE MANAGEMENT, RECORDING AND 
INVESTIGATION OF MISSING PERSONS 16, 61–62 (2d ed. 2010), 
http://library.college.police.uk/docs/npia/missing-persons-guidance-2010.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/U93W-X4Y9] (archived Jan. 20, 2021). 
63. See ‘LIKE A PART OF A PUZZLE WHICH IS MISSING’: THE IMPACT ON FAMILIES 
OF A RELATIVE MISSING IN MIGRATION ACROSS THE MEDITERRANEAN, supra note 57, at 
1. If the death toll between 1996 and 2000 through to 2018 are added together, the IOM 
estimates that the number of deaths may be more than 75,000 deaths. See Marta 
Sánchez Dionis & Kate Dearden, Missing Migrants Project Data: A Global Overview, in 
4 FATAL JOURNEYS: MISSING MIGRANT CHILDREN, supra note 59, at 1, 1.  
64. See Latest Global Figures: Migrant Fatalities Worldwide, MISSING MIGRANTS, 
https://missingmigrants.iom.int/latest-global-figures (last visited Jan. 20, 2021) [https://
perma.cc/3WF4-WJMR] (archived Jan. 20, 2021). 
65. Simons Robins, Analysis of Best Practices on the Identification of Missing 
Migrants: Implications for the Central Mediterranean, IOM 6 (2019), 
https://gmdac.iom.int/node/517 [https://perma.cc/F3TZ-R6KC] (archived Jan. 20, 2021) 
[hereinafter Robins, Analysis].   
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figure at twenty throusand deaths as of April 2020.66 Experts report 
that between 2017 and 2018, some 4,100 people died crossing the 
Central Mediterranean route, making it the world’s deadliest 
migration route (accounting for about 77 percent of total migrant 
deaths in the Mediterranean).67 The actual death toll is most likely to 
be higher as many migrant fatalities also happen in isolated parts of 
the world and are never recorded.68 For many of the dead migrants, 
their bodies are never recovered and no story is told about their 
whereabouts. And where dead bodies are recovered, they are in most 
cases buried in unmarked graves with no proper identification.69 The 
net identification rate of migrant bodies between 1990 and 2013 stands 
at just about 22 percent.70 In these situations of deaths and loss, 
international law places “obligations”71—derived from human rights 
 
66. Kate Dearden, Marta Sánchez Dionis, Julia Black & Frank Laczko, 
CALCULATING “DEATH RATES” IN THE CONTEXT OF MIGRATION JOURNEYS: FOCUS ON THE 
CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN 3 (2020), https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/
mortality-rates.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/B9DS-BBSF] (archived 
Jan. 20. 2021). 
67. Robins, Analysis, supra note 65, at 6. 
68. See Dionis & Dearden, supra note 63, at vii. 
69. See Robins, Analysis, supra note 65, at 28. 
70. Id. at 6; see also Tamara Last, Giorgia Mirto, Orçun Ulusoy, Ignacio Urquijo, 
Joke Harte,Nefeli Bami, Marta Pérez Pérez, Flor Macias Delgado, Amélie Tapella, 
Alexandra Michalaki, Eirini Michalitsi, Efi Latsoudi, Naya Tselepi, Marios 
Chatziprokopiou & Thomas Spijkerboer, Deaths at the Borders Database: Evidence of 
Deceased Migrants’ Bodies Found Along the Southern External Borders of the European 
Union, 43 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 693, 693–712 (2017); cf. Amelia Tapella, Giorgia 
Mirto & Tamara Last, Deaths at the Borders. From Institutional Carelessness to Private 
Concern, 5 RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLE IDEE 57, 57–64 (2016). 
71. In this article, the term “obligation” is used interchangeably with 
“responsibility” and “duties” for good and practical reasons.  For example, most 
researchers in the ethics, normative political philosophy, and legal and socio-legal areas 
often treat the words ‘obligations,’ ‘responsibilities,’ and ‘duties’ as synonymous. See 
generally Michael J. Zimmerman, Duty and Obligation, INT’L ENCYCLOPAEDIA ETHICS 
(Feb. 1, 2013), https://novel-coronavirus.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/97814
44367072.wbiee158 (last visited Jan. 18, 2021) [https://perma.cc/GUH2-43UB] (archived 
Jan. 18, 2021). In keeping with this liberal practice, I will use the terms ‘obligations,’ 
‘responsibilities,’ and ‘duties’ interchangeably in this article. This approach is supported 
by the consistent and frequent use of ‘responsibility’ to refer to ‘obligations’ in several 
international treaties, many of which will be referred to in this article. For example, the 
use of the phrase “responsibility to protect” in the 2001 report of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICCSIS) refers to the bundle of 
primary obligations of states to protect their population from gross and systematic 
human rights violations. See Chelsea O’Donnell, The Development of the Responsibility 
to Protect: An Examination of the Debate Over the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention, 
24 DUKE J. COMPAR. & INT’L L. 557, 558–59; G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 4 (Sept. 20, 2005); Astha 
Pandey, The Responsibility to Protect (“R2P”) in International Law: Protection of Human 
Rights or Destruction of State Sovereignty?, 2 NLUJ L. REV. 115, 115 (2013); Carsten 
Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm, 101 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 99, 99–100 (2007). See generally Alex J. Bellamy, Whither the Responsibility to 
Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the World Summit, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 143 
(2006), https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A150366712/AONE?u=tel_a_vanderbilt&sid=AO
358            VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 54:343 
 
treaties—on states to not only search for missing migrants, but also 
investigate migrant deaths and respect the rights of their families.72 
Despite such legal provisions, the EU “Resolution,”73 and the 
“European Agenda on Migration,”74 states sometimes deny that they 
have legal obligations to “search and rescue,”75 recover, identify, and, 
in the case of death, repatriate bodies of dead migrants to their 
families.76 This is reflected in the policy agendas of many states. Such 
denial/noncompliance comes with severe social and psychological 
consequences for families of missing migrants who are waiting for news 
on the fates of their missing relatives. Families are often left in the 
dark, creating ambiguity as to what has become of their missing loved 
ones.77 In a situation where migrants die and go missing in 
transnational migration, the central normative aspiration of 
transnational law is that such human problems that transcend borders 
should be tackled through a transnational legal and policy approach. 
The main argument pursued in this Article is that meeting such 
normative aspirations of transnational law when responding to the 
problem of missing migrants would require a transnationally effective 
national migration policy. As will be pointed out later in this Article, 
the transborder nature and character of the problem of missing 
migrants, the externalization of national migration policies and border 
controls in response thereof, and the extra-territorialization of 
jurisdiction and positive human rights obligations of states towards 
missing migrants all justify this argument. 
 
NE&xid=bb791f16 (last visited Jan. 18, 2021) [https://perma.cc/HP4U-D48T] (archived 
Jan. 18, 2021).   In the legal commentaries annexed to the 2001 International Law 
Commission Draft Articles on Responsibilities of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, the term ‘responsibility’ was used to refer to states qua states’ ‘obligations’ 
internationally. See Int’l L. Comm., Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Comments. on its 53d Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, 
at art. 33, ¶ 3 (2001). Also, Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration uses 
‘responsibility’ to refer ‘obligations’ of all states to prevent transboundary harm to the 
environment. Rep. of the U.N. Conf. on the Hum. Env’t., U.N. A/Conf.48/14/Rev.1, at 5 
(1972); see also G.A. Res. A/RES/2994, ¶ 1 (Dec. 15, 1972), 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f1c840.html (accessed Jan. 18, 2021) [https://
perma.cc/TTB3-HW4B] (archived Jan. 18, 2021). This practice is also seen in several 
other international human rights treaties. 
72. See GRANT, supra note 57, at 8, 13. 
73. See generally 2013 O.J. (C 208).  
74. See generally A European Agenda on Migration, COM (2015) 240 final (May 
13, 2015) [hereinafter European Agenda on Migration]. 
75. Like the question of cost of repatriation of migrant bodies, there is also always 
the question raised by states as to who should bear the cost of rescue of migrants at sea. 
For more on this question, see David Miller, Our Responsibilities to Refugees, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2018 ZIF WORKSHOP 37, 40 (2018).  
76. See Robins, Missing in Migration, supra note 25, at 24. 
77. See Grant, supra note 58, at 129.  
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III.  WHAT DO WE MEAN BY A TRANSNATIONALLY EFFECTIVE NATIONAL 
MIGRATION POLICY? 
 Following from the above characterisation of the problem of 
missing migrants in light of transnational law, how should we define a 
transnationally effective national migration policy that meets the 
normative requirements of transnational law when global states are 
responding to the problem of missing migrants? The starting premise 
is that migrants, by crossing national borders in their attempt to reach 
an international destination, challenge an international system built 
on the foundation of state sovereignty and national jurisdiction. As 
such, transnational migrant journeys clearly demonstrate that “people 
and institutions are no longer constrained by national boundaries.”78 
Viewed from this angle, a transnationally effective national policy 
would mean policies initiated within the domestic legal order, with 
their impact, positive as it should be, keenly felt by migrant 
populations outside the territory of the relevant state. If you make a 
policy at home and its actual impact, effects, and/or practical outcomes 
save a life abroad or foster cooperative relationships between actors 
abroad, then, such a policy may be said to be good and transnationally 
effective. Not least because it is promoting shared values of human 
dignity and public order beyond borders.79  
 In other words, the policy is made at home, but its implementation 
by national authorities produces effective and desired results over 
relevant subjects, territories, situations, and persons abroad. Such a 
transnational policy approach to dealing with pressing human 
problems should see the executive, judicial, and legislative policy-
making competences of national governments in relation to migration 
unify both within and outside their borders80 for a common purpose—
the safety and protection of migrants. This approach should move us 
closer to realising the moral and political precepts and pragmatic 
problem-solving aspiration of international human rights, which 
promises to “penetrate the impregnable state borders and gradually 
replace it with the authority of international law.”81 However, 
 
78. Georg Vobruba, The Limits of Borders, in SOCIAL POLICY BEYOND BORDERS 
15, 15–49 (Abram de Swaan ed., 1994) (cited in Margaret Sherraden, Developing 
Transnational Social Policy: A North American Community Service Program 1, 1 (Ctr. 
for Soc. Dev. Glo. Serv. Inst., Working Paper Nos. 1-10, 2001)).   
79. See generally Abram de Swaan, The Receding Prospects for Transnational 
Social Policy, 26 THEORY & SOC’Y, no. 4, 1997, at 563 (discussing extensively what a 
transnational social policy should mean in the context of reducing poverty in the world). 
80. Cf. Mann, Dialectic, supra note 34, at 315–16 (arguing that the policy-making 
and implementation competences of the various arms of national government are 
sometimes unified by sovereignty and separated by borders). 
81. SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 1 (2010); cf. 
Paul Kahn, The Question of Sovereignty, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 259, 262 (2004) (hinting at 
the transnational philosophical belief expressed in the post-Cold War era suggesting that 
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questions may be asked about what this so defined transnationally 
effective national migration policy should mean for states in terms of 
the wider “global migration governance.”82 This is imperative given 
that the institutional structures that regulate/shape how states deal 
with transnational migration builds upon transnational legal norms.  
 Taking the United Kingdom as an example, it will be more 
appropriate to ask: What aspects of and through what channels should 
the United Kingdom engage with and promote the global migration 
governance agenda in relation to missing migrants? Also, how can we 
measure the transnational effectiveness of a national migration policy 
that may be initiated by states as part of that migration governance 
agenda? And where, in particular, in terms of specific places/territories 
may such a transnationally effective national migration policy be 
applied and enforced? Addressing these issues matters for the United 
Kingdom because they will not only determine how the country is going 
to engage with the transnational migration governance but will also 
“shape what on the institutional, political and normative level global 
migration governance should mean for the United Kingdom,”83 
especially now that it is no longer part of the EU. In order to address 
the transnational problem of missing migrants, the United Kingdom 
can start by giving full legal effects (beyond political declaration) to 
those aspects that prioritize the humanitarian imperatives of saving 
migrant lives at sea. This extends to facilitating transnational 
investigations into migrant deaths, repatriation of migrant bodies, and 
addressing the psychosocial needs of their families. The United 
Kingdom can promote this transnational migration policy approach 
through bilateral channels; multilateral channels;84 and informal, 
 
human rights that ground the most basic considerations about international morality 
are gradually replacing sovereignty “as the foundation of the international legal order”). 
82. Alexander Betts & Lena Kainz, The History of Global Migration Governance 
1,1 (Refugee  Working Paper Series No. 122, Refugee Stud. Ctr., Univ. Oxford, Working 
Paper No. 122, 2017) (defining global migration governance as the “norms and 
organizational that regulate and facilitate states’ and other actors’ responses to 
migration”); see also Demetrios G. Papademetriou, The Governance of International 
Migration: Defining the Potential for Reform in the Next Decade, COUNCIL STATEMENT, 
SIXTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE TRANSATLANTIC COUNCIL ON MIGRATION 1, 1 (2011) 
(defining global migration governance as the “creation of a more or less formal set of 
norms and rules to regulate the behaviour of states with respect to the movement of 
people across borders”); Kathleen Newland, The Governance of International Migration: 
Mechanisms, Processes and Institutions, 16 GLOB. GOVERNANCE 331, 331 (2010) 
(discussing how global migration governance has evolved as a policy issue on the 
international level over the last decade).   
83. Betts, Policy Primer, supra note 36, at 2 (asking institutional, political and 
normative questions about global migration governance and what this should mean for 
the UK as a global leader). 
84. At the level of “multilateralism”, the UK participates on international and 
regional deliberations about global migration governance in response to irregular 
migration through the UN and EU. See id. at 6. 
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transnational networks85 since the country already has a proven record 
of global migration governance through these channels.   
 Next, we determine how we can measure the effectiveness of this 
proposed transnational migration policy in relation to missing 
migrants. It is argued that taking into account the normative goals of 
transnational law, the effectiveness of a such a transnational 
migration policy can be measured in three ways. The first is to measure 
it against the extent to which it has been able to realise the desired 
public intended goal and/or policy outcomes. Thus, it is imperative to 
know what the specific public goals are that states aim to achieve when 
responding to the problem of missing migrants. In practical terms and 
judging from the provisions of the GCM (Objective 8)86 and UN 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development (Goal 10.7),87 it is suggested that 
states strive for two fundamental and synergic goals when responding 
to the problem of missing migrants. The first is to promote and realise 
a safe, orderly, and regular migration world88 based on the principles 
of human dignity where migrants are not deliberately ignored, 
increasing the risk of dying and going missing. And where states are 
committed to searching for and finding those already reported dead or 
missing, repatriating their bodies to their families89 whilst also finding 
answers to questions about those who subsequently remain missing. 
The second goal is to secure a migration world based on respect for 
public order. Hence the use of the term “orderly” in the GCM; that is 
to say, to prevent and deter violations of “public order”90 caused by 
unsafe, disorderly, irregular, and irresponsible migration. And where 
 
85. At the level of “informal networks”, the UK works through organisations like 
the IOM and the Intergovernmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugees and Migration 
(IGC) to develop best practices in response to the transnational problem of irregular 
migration. See id. 
86. See Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, supra note 26, 
objective 8. 
87. See Sustainable Development 2030 Agenda, U.N. Doc. A/Res/70/1, at 23 
(2015), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/21252030%20Agend
a%20for%20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/88EV-ZE7X] (archived Jan. 20, 2021) (Goal 10.7 provides that part of 
the agenda of the world states is to “facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible 
migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and 
well-managed migration policies”).  
88. See Elspeth Guild, The UN’s Search for a Global Compact on Safe, Orderly 
and Regular Migration, 18 GER. L.J. 1780 (2017); see also Elspeth Guild, Unsafe, 
Disorderly and Irregular Migration? Examining the Assumptions Underlying the United 
Nations’ New York Declaration, 50 CAN. J. PEACE & CONFLICT STUD., no. 1, 2018, at 53. 
89. It must be acknowledged that repatriation of migrant bodies is big challenge 
because of the huge financial cost involved and the lack of political will on the part of 
states. See generally Kovras & Robins, supra note 58, at 40–49. 
90. In this article, I conceive the notion of “public order” as “orderliness” in human 
society as opposed to “chaos”. For wider jurisprudential debate on the different 
conceptions of public order, see generally Christopher J. Borgen, Whose Public, Whose 
Order? Imperium, Region and Normative Friction, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 331 (2007).  
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public order has already been violated or is under threat of imminent 
violation, to suspend and restore order. Also, to correct any decried 
behaviour of migrants that may generate public order violations whilst 
also reconstructing the wider social process in society that provide 
fertile ground for public order violations to occur.91 
 The second way we can judge the transnational effectiveness of a 
state policy is by looking at the extent to which it has been received, 
accepted, and/or rejected in terms of its consistency and compatibility 
with international legal norms and/or treaties to which the relevant 
state has acceded. However, it should be understood that a legal or 
policy instrument is not considered transnationally effective merely 
because it has been accepted internationally, perhaps, because it 
complies with existing international norms. This is important because 
state migration policies may, in fact, be legally compliant with 
transnational legal norms yet produce dreadful results for migrants. 
So, beyond compliance with international legal norms, normative 
aspirations of transnational law demand that such policy produces a 
desired positive result/outcome capable of addressing a problem in 
remote lands robustly. Not least since states now live in a regime of 
mutual interdependence.92 Therefore, the presence of migrants—
whether in origin or transit states—can generate external effects that 
affect the receiving states and vice versa. Thus, as migrants fleeing 
wars from poor countries increasingly continue to confront the rich 
ones with protection requests, the rich countries are invited to respond 
by adopting national policies with cross-border positive effects. Such 
transnationally effective policies would need to be designed to address 
issues around the protection of lives of migrants and the investigation 
of migrant deaths. By the same token, they should also control the 
persistent and intrusive external effects that the migration crisis 
might have on states, including those arising from migrant deaths and 
migrants going missing. 
 The third way to look at the transnational effectiveness of a state 
migration policy is to examine the extent to which such policy 
 
91. These public order goals outlined herein in relation to migrant journeys are 
adapted from W.M. Reisman’s delineation of seven synergetic goals that the 
international community seeks to achieve responding to crimes of genocide and other 
serious violations of human rights in the world. See generally W.M. Reisman, Legal 
Responses to Genocide and Other Massive Violations of Human Rights, 59 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., No. 4, 1996, at 75; see also Rosa Pati, Trading in Humans: A New Haven 
Perspective, 20 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 140 (2012). 
92. See, e.g., de Swaan, supra note 79, at 563 (recognising increasing global 
interdependencies as a condition for emergence of a transnationally effective social 
policy); see also Christoph Conrad, Social Policy History After the Transnational Turn, 
in BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE MODELS: TRANSNATIONAL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 
ON SOCIAL POLICY 218, 218–21 (Paulli Kettunen & Klaus Petersen eds., 2011) 
(emphasising the imperatives of mutual interdependence in society when asking “who 
wants to stay single . . . ?”). 
2021]                UK MIGRATION POLICIES 363 
 
 
recognises the fact that an effective and goal-oriented policy response 
to the transnational problem of missing migrants would require a close 
dialogue and synergy in the transnational arena between the legal and 
moral dimensions of obligations of states towards migrants. By that it 
is meant that policy responses of states to missing migrants cannot in 
transnational terms be determined only by what states can do legally 
but also what they can do morally. Not least since human rights law, 
from where most of the relevant obligations of states towards missing 
migrants are derived, also grounds the most basic considerations about 
international morality.93 Such policy approach conceived, even if 
ambitiously, will allow for “extricating human life generally from the 
false necessities of market dealings”94 that seem to characterise 
transnational migration policymaking and enforcement. That is to say, 
for a national policy to produce the desired transnational effects, there 
has to be a close interface between the exercise of moral and legal 
obligations of states towards transborder migrants in a mutually 
reinforcing and inclusive way, especially when human rights of 
migrants to life are at issue.  
 For example, while the duty to rescue migrants at sea is an 
obligation created by international law of the sea95 and international 
human rights law96 to uphold the right to life, repatriation of migrant 
bodies is more likely to fall within the moral aspect of state obligations. 
This is without prejudice to the fact that the duty to repatriate corpses 
across international borders has both been recognised under the 
International Arrangement Concerning the Conveyance of Corpses 
1937,97 which remains in force; and the Council of Europe Agreement 
 
93. See, e.g., Romuald R. Haule, Some Reflections on the Foundation of Human 
Rights—Are Human Rights an Alternative to Moral Values?, 10 MAX PLANCK U.N.Y.B. 
367, 388–92 (2006) (discussing extensively the moral foundations of human rights). 
94. Alexander Somek, The Social Question in a Transnational Context, in LSE 
‘EUROPE IN QUESTION’ DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, Abstract (2011), 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/53215/1/LEQSPaper39.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/D3RJ-UC4Z] (archived Jan. 20, 2021). 
95. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 98(1), Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UN Convention on the Law of the Sea] (providing 
that “every state shall require the master of a ship flying its flag . . . (a) to render 
assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost, (b) to proceed with all 
possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress . . .” (emphasis added)); see also 
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue chs. II, IV, V, Apr. 27, 1979, 
1403 U.N.T.S. (recognising the obligations of states to render assistance and establish 
search and rescue facilities). 
96. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 
1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, 
Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Rep. 102-23, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; 
American Convention on Human Rights, Organization of American States art. 4, Nov. 
22, 1969.  
97. Arrangement Concerning the Conveyance of Corpses, 1938, League of 
Nations T.S. 189 Doc. 4391, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/248444/db12fd
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Concerning the Conveyance of Corpses 1973,98 which gives the 
obligation to repatriate a legal efficacy. And also, the 2019 Guiding 
Principles for the Search for Disappeared Persons stating the need for 
transnational, concerted efforts into enforced disappearances whereby 
“states concerned should develop cooperation agreements and 
establish competent authorities to allow for effective coordination in 
the search for disappeared persons at each stage of migration.”99 Thus 
the inextricability and/or interface between legal and moral obligations 
of states is particularly important. Not least because if we leave it at 
what states can do legally leaving out the moral aspects of the 
obligations, we would fall into the familiar trap of accepting the flawed 
argument that until migrants reach state territories, no state could be 
legally or morally responsible towards migrants.100  
 In terms of “where,” that is, the specific places and territories 
where a transnational policy may be applied, enforced, and made 
effective, it is suggested that it is tied to the question of exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and migration controls by states.101 This is 
no least the case because it raises fundamental issues regarding state 
responsibility for extraterritorialised and externalised migration 
controls.102 In principle and in practice, there are three possible ways 
 
9011dcd9dfded7fe14eda56acb/vertragstextoriginal-data.pdf (accessed Jan. 20, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/53DJ-UH2H] (archived Jan. 20, 2021). The initial signatories to the 
treaty, also known as the Berlin Arrangement, included some major European powers: 
Germany, Belgium, Chile, Denmark, France, Italy, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and 
Turkey. The Berlin Arrangement is complemented by domestic laws and regulations for 
international repatriation of bodies in each state as well as the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) Rules. 
98. Council of Europe Agreement on the Transfer of Corpses, 1973, E.T.S. No. 80, 
Strasbourg, 26.X. 1973, https://rm.coe.int/168007617d (last visited Jan. 21, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/54VU-DEED] (archived Jan. 21, 2021); see also Explanatory Report to 
the Agreement on the Transfer of Corpses, 1973, E.T.S. No. 80, Strasbourg, 26.X. 1973, 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?docume
ntId=09000016800c96c9 (accessed Jan. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/LDX5-MRJM] (arch-
ived Jan. 21, 2021).  
99. See Guiding Principles for the Search for Disappeared Persons, Principle 9(3), 
May 8, 2019,  U.N. Doc. CED/C/7, https://www.menschenrechte.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/12/Guiding-principles-for-the-search-for-disappeared-persons.pdf (last vi-
sited Jan. 21, 2020) [https://perma.cc/SC7M-FUVT] (archived Jan. 21, 2021). 
100. See Maria Nagore Casas, The Instruments of Pre-Border Control in the EU: A 
New Source of Vulnerability for Asylum Seekers, J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL., no. 7, 2019, at 
162. 
101. Mustapha Dikec, The “Where” of Asylum, 27 ENV’T & PLAN. D: SOC’Y & SPACE 
183, 183–89 (2009) (arguing that the question of “where” in asylum, border management 
and migration controls matters in contemporary discourses about immigration). 
102. See also Violeta Moreno-Lax & Martin Lemberg-Pedersen, Border-Induced 
Displacement: The Ethical and Legal Implications of Distance-Creation Through 
Externalisation, 56 QUESTIONS INT’L L., no. 1, 2019, at 6 (arguing that places where 
externalised/extraterritorialised migration distance-creation is practiced by states in a 
bid to deny responsibility for migration controls “plays a crucial role as a mechanism not 
only of dispersion of legal duties, blurring the lines of causation and making attribution 
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in which states can effectively govern or enforce migration measures 
that affect migrants. The first is through exercising effective control 
and jurisdiction over migrants who enter their territories by any 
means whether through the sea routes, air, or external borders of the 
state. The second is through extraterritorial conduct in the sense of 
exercising external control over migrants and the territories where the 
migrants are and situations facing such migrants abroad.103 And the 
third is through domestic conduct, in the sense of pursuing and 
enforcing national migration policies that produce extraterritorial or 
transnational effects outside the national territory of the states 
involved.104 Consequently, when migrant deaths at sea, borders and 
other migration spaces are alleged, the obligation of states (territorial 
and extraterritorial) can be triggered and therefore, states can be held 
responsible for: 
 
i. acts they carry out within their own territories (land and 
water) including where the effects (e.g., migrant deaths and 
migrants going missing) produced by those acts occur within 
the territory of that state; 
ii. acts that occur inside the territorial confines of a given state, 
and those acts produces an effect outside the territory of that 
state; 
iii. acts that take place at international sea, or on the internal 
waters of states.105 
 
While there have been no arguments about the right of states to 
effectively control and exercise jurisdiction over migrants within their 
own national territories, controversies continue to surround states’ 
exercises of jurisdiction and effective control over migrants outside 
their own territories. These questions have become pivotal when it 
comes to invoking or attributing legal responsibility for violations of 
migrants’ rights and also legal responsibility for those who die and go 
missing as an effect of the implementation of externalised and 
 
of wrongful conduct a difficult task, but also as an artefact of oppression and 
displacement in itself”). 
103. This has been held by the ECtHR in a number of cases including Al-Skeini v. 
The United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 589 (2011). 
104. See generally Lorand Bartels, The EU’s Human Rights Obligations in 
Relation to Policies with Extraterritorial Effects, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1071 (2015) 
(discussing the issue in the context of human rights violations of persons by states, 
inclusive of the EU, EU member states, and EU institutions outside their territories and 
their implications under EU law); cf. Thomas Spijkerboer, Are European States 
Responsible for Border Deaths?, in ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO MIGRATION LAW, 
THEORY AND POLICY 61, 61–63 (Satvinder S. Juss ed., 2011) [hereinafter Spijkerboer, Are 
European States Responsible for Border Deaths?]. 
105. See generally Spijkerboer, Are European States Responsible for Border 
Deaths?, supra note 104, at 63–66. 
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securitised migration procedures. In this Article, the question of 
“where” implies any place or territory where migrants come under the 
direct or indirect control and jurisdiction of states whether it is inside 
their own national territories or outside the territorial borders of the 
relevant states. This extends to the controlling authority and 
jurisdiction of the EU and EU states over migrants within the EU and 
outside the external borders of the EU.106  
 Taking into account the wider EU legal and policy responses to 
the migrant/refugee crisis, this would include, for example, EU states’ 
exercise of jurisdiction and effective control over migrants in the 
Mediterranean Sea (the epicentre of the crisis) and other sea routes as 
well as those at the external borders of states, refugee camps, detention 
facilities, and other places no matter how distant in time, geography, 
and space. It is true that transnational migrant journeys, deaths, and 
disappearances often take place in transit between different national 
territories, sovereignties, and jurisdictions making it apparently 
difficult to allocate responsibilities to states to search for missing 
migrants whilst also identifying and repatriating migrant bodies.107 
However, there is little room to doubt that the externalised migration 
and border control policies of many states contribute to the clandestine 
dynamics of such migrant journeys and fatalities. Therefore, 
responsibility can be attributed to those states in extraterritorial 
settings.  
 Specifically, with respect to responsibility of European states for 
extraterritorial control and jurisdiction over migrants, the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has consistently held that, although 
the European Convention on Human Rights was intended to function 
primarily within the espace juridique of the European contracting 
states,108 certain protective principles in international refugee law, 
such as the nonrefoulement principle apply extraterritorially. This is 
so because “acts of authorities whether performed within or outside 
 
106. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union arts. 3(2), 21, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 17, 28 (recognising the legal 
responsibility of the EU over its internal policies that produces external effects outside 
the external borders of the EU). 
107. See Estela Schindel, Border Matters: Death, Mourning and Materiality at the 
European Borderlands, EUROPE NOW (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.europenowjournal.or
g/2020/04/27/border-matters-death-mourning-and-materiality-at-the-european-borderla
nds/ [https://perma.cc/K49U-E9SC] (archived Jan. 19, 2021). 
108. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, supra note 96, art. 1; Banković v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R.  ¶ 80. See 
generally Cedric Ryngaert, Clarifying the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 28 MERKOURIOS: UTRECHT J. INT’L & EUR. L. 57 (2012) 
(discussing the scope of the European Convention on Human Rights and states’ 
jurisdictions over persons within that state and abroad). 
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national boundaries produce effects outside their own territory.”109 For 
Itamar Mann, the transnational obligations of states in the field of 
migration, when declared by courts with authority as the ECtHR, 
clearly “figure in the transnational legal consciousness as a law on 
which all other law must depend; indeed a kind of global [norm].”110 
Such transnational law awareness upholds the fact that obligations of 
states towards migrants extends extraterritorially especially with 
regard to search and rescue of migrants trapped at sea but also before 
migrants reach the sea. And this obligation emanates from provisions 
of international human rights law, law of the sea, and other 
international treaties read together, interpreted, and applied in light 
of the principle and duty of due diligence.111 This is more so given that 
the internal and external migration control procedures of states 
implies/triggers jurisdiction (territorial and extraterritorial) of those 
states under international law112—not least because migration control 
is consistently assumed to be the primary prerogative of states.113 
Hence, it is not uncommon to attribute legal responsibility to states for 
 
109. Loizidou v. Turkey, Preliminary Objections, 15318/89 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 62 
(1996).  
110. Mann, Dialectic, supra note 34, at 326. 
111. Tzevelekos & Proukaki, supra note 23, at 429. 
112. See Ruben Wissing, Allocating Responsibility for Refugee Protecting to States: 
Actual and Potential Criteria in International (Case) Law, in MIGRATION ISSUES BEFORE 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 45, 45–64 (Giovanni Carlo Bruno, Fulvio Maria 
Palombino & Adriana di Stefano eds., 2019) (evaluating solutions for allocations of 
migrants in international jurisprudence).  
113. The fact that immigration control is considered a prerogative right of states 
is widely recognised in literature. John Rawls, the principal theorist of global justice, 
was one of the earliest scholars to mention, though quite marginally, in The Law of 
Peoples, the right of states to exercise immigration control. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW 
OF PEOPLES: WITH “THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON REVISITED” 9, 108 (Harvard Univ. Press 
1999). Subsequently, Michael Walzer expanded on the prerogative right of states to 
exercise immigration control by deciding on their own immigration and admission 
policies. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND 
EQUALITY 31–61 (1983); see also Christopher Heath Wellman, Immigration and Freedom 
of Association, 119 ETHICS 109, 109–19 (2008); Michael Blake, Immigration, in A 
COMPANION TO APPLIED ETHICS 224 (R.G. Frey & Christopher Heath Wellman eds., 
2005); Susan Kneebone, Controlling Migration by Sea: The Australian Case, in 
EXTRATERRITORIAL IMMIGRATION CONTROL: LEGAL CHALLENGES 347 (Bernard Ryan & 
Valamis Mitsilegas eds., 2010); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 658 
(1892) (“It is an accepted maxim of international law that every sovereign nation has the 
power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the 
entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon 
such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.”); cf. Musgrove v. Chun Teong Toy [1891] 
AC 272; James A.R. Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens Under International Law, 
77 AM. J. INT’L L. 804 (1983) (challenging states’ recognized exclusionary principles). The 
argument for states to exercise immigration control is consistent with the egalitarian 
argument for “closed borders.” See Arash Abizadeh, Liberal Egalitarian Arguments for 
Closed Borders: Some Preliminary Critical Reflections, 4 ÉTHIQUE ET ÉCONOMIQUE 
[ETHICS & ECONOMICS], no. 1, 2006, at 1, 1–8. But see Joseph Carens, Aliens and Citizens: 
The Case for Open Borders, 49 R. POL. 251, 263–70 (1987).  
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such controls, especially in cases where they result in human rights 
violations of migrants114 leading to migrant deaths and migrants going 
missing at sea, borders, and externalised migration spaces. 
IV.  POLICY RESPONSES TO THE TRANSNATIONAL PROBLEM OF MISSING 
MIGRANTS AT THE EU LEVEL 
 As stated at the beginning of this Article, the UK response to the 
transnational problem of missing migrants and migration in a wider 
sense draws more broadly from the EU policy responses to the problem, 
despite the fact that the United Kingdom is no longer part of the EU. 
Thus, it is important to start with the analysis of the EU policy 
responses to the problem and then proceed to the United Kingdom’s 
response, reasoning clearly and consistently from the EU policy 
standpoint. Generally, between 2015 and 2016, Europe was at the 
receiving end of what is widely believed to be the most unprecedented 
influx of migrants and refugees into any region since World War II, 
with over one million arrivals115 and many dying and going missing in 
the process. Thus, the increasing number of migrant arrivals and 
deaths in the Mediterranean and at EU external borders represents a 
major European concern that has and continues to play a critical role 
in framing the EU’s legal and policy responses to the problem of 
missing migrants. However, the question of what should be the 
appropriate legal and policy response of states to the migrant crisis has 
been one of “obsession of sorts, not only in Europe, but also in other 
parts of the so-called developed world.”116 Nonetheless, some may 
 
114. See, e.g., Giuseppe Pascale, Is Italy Internationally Responsible for the Gross 
Human Rights Violations Against Migrants in Libya?, 56 QUESTIONS INT’L L. 35, 38–41 
(2019) (discussing extensively the international legal responsibility of Italy for gross 
human rights violations against migrants in Libya and for its strategy of outsourcing 
border control to Libya to stem the tide of migration flows in the Central Mediterranean 
Sea); Giulia Ciliberto, Libya’s Pull-Backs of Boat Migrants: Can Italy Be Held 
Accountable for Violations of International Law, 4 ITALIAN L.J. 489 (2018); Marina 
Mancini, Italy’s New Migration Control Policy: Stemming the Flow of Migrants from 
Libya Without Regard for their Human Rights: Notes and Comments, 27 ITALIAN Y.B. 
INT’L L. 273 (2017). 
115. See Jonathan Clayton & Hereward Holland, Over One Million Sea Arrivals 
Reach Europe in 2015,  UNCHR (Dec. 30, 2015), https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/latest/
2015/12/5683d0b56/million-sea-arrivals-reach-europe-2015.html [https://perma.cc/YYP6
-6FHR] (archived Jan. 24, 2021); Philippe Fargues & Sara Bonfati, When the Best Option 
Is a Leaky Boat: Why Migrants Risk Their Lives Crossing the Mediterranean and What 
Europe Is Doing About It, MIGRATION POL’Y CTR. EUR. U. INST. 2 (Oct. 2014),  
https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/33271/MPC_PB_2014-05.pdf?sequence=1 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2021) [https://perma.cc/A7HZ-AGNG] (archived Jan. 24, 2021). 
116. ITAMAR MANN, HUMANITY AT SEA: MARITIME MIGRATION AND THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (Larissa van den Herik & Jean D’Aspremont 
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2016); cf. Dana Schmalz, Book Review, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
649, 649–53 (2017) (reviewing MANN, supra note 116).  
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argue that the political resolve captured in the phrase “never again”117 
represents the commitment that is highly likely to be the EU’s long-
term legal and policy response to the problem of missing migrants and 
the Europe migrant crisis in a wider sense. The EU’s response to 
growing migrant flows to Europe extends to the use of surveillance 
technologies to monitor and capture migrant mobilities;118 the use of 
push-back operations;119 the interception and interdiction of boat 
migrants at sea;120 the border and coastal policing and role of migrant 
smugglers; as well as the biopolitical perspectives on such response 
measures in terms of their connections to migrant deaths at sea, 
borders, and other migration spaces.121 To enable the EU to enforce 
these policy response measures through a common regional front, 
migration policies at the EU level have increasingly been initiated and 
determined within the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs framework.122 
 
117. “Never Again” was a statement of commitment adopted by the international 
community of states as a response to serious humanitarian crises that have shocked the 
conscience of humanity. See Barbara Stark, After/word(s): Violations of Human Dignity 
and Postmodern International Law, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 315, 322 (2002) (“‘Never again!’ 
swore world leaders after World War II.”). See generally LANE H. MONTGOMERY, NEVER 
AGAIN, AGAIN, AGAIN…: GENOCIDE: ARMENIA, THE HOLOCAUST, CAMBODIA, RWANDA, 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, AND DARFUR (Susan Slack ed., 2007) (illustrating how 
genocides and atrocities continue to occur despite promises made by the public not to 
allow them to do so). 
118. See Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert, Control or Rescue at Sea? Aims and Limits of 
Border Surveillance Technologies in the Mediterranean Sea, 42 DISASTERS 674, 674–75 
(2018). 
119. See Mariagiulia Giuffré, State Responsibility Beyond Borders: What Legal 
Basis for Italy’s Push-backs to Libya?, 24 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 692, 692–93 (2013). 
120. See Violeta Moreno-Lax, Daniel Ghezelbash & Natalie Klein, Between Life, 
Security and Rights: Framing Interdiction of ‘Boat Migrants’ in the Central 
Mediterranean and Australia, 32 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 715, 715–16 (2019). 
121. See generally Stephanie Grant, Recording and Identifying European Frontier 
Deaths, 13 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 135 (2011) [hereinafter Grant, Recording and 
Identifying]; Luiza Bialasiewicz, Off-Shoring and Out-Sourcing the Borders of EUrope: 
Libya and EU Border Work in the Mediterranean, 17 GEOPOLITICS 843 (2012); ANNA 
TRIANDAFYLLIDOU & THANOS MAROUKIS, MIGRANT SMUGGLING: IRREGULAR MIGRATION 
FROM ASIA AND AFRICA TO EUROPE (2012) (discussing the role and organisation of 
migrant smuggling within the phenomenon of irregular migration); Topak E. Özgün, The 
Biopolitical Border in Practice: Surveillance and Death at the Greece-Turkey Boderzones, 
32 ENV’T & PLAN. D: SOC’Y & SPACE 815 (2014) (using the Greece/Turkey borderzone as 
a case study in evaluating borders and their politics); SIMON ROBINS, IOSIF KOVRAS & 
ANNA VALLIANATOU, ADDRESSING MIGRANT BODIES IN EUROPE’S SOUTHERN FRONTIER 
(2014). 
122. See Ben Attia, Tara Brian, Adrian Carrasco Heiermann, Stefanie Grant, 
Catriona Jarvis, Iosif Kovras, Frank Laczko, Giorgia Mirto, Katerina Polychroni, Simon 
Robins, Ann Singleton & Amal Shaiah, Missing Migrants: Management of Dead Bodies 
in Sicily, Italy Summary Report, MEDITERRANEAN MISSING PROJECT 4 (2016), 
http://iosifkovras.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Summary-Report-on-Missing-Migra
nts-in-Italy.pdf [https://perma.cc/68UJ-GMF4] (archived March 16, 2021) [hereinafter 
Attia et al.]. 
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Since the adoption of the “Maastricht Treaty,”123 the “Dublin III 
Regulation,”124 the “Schengen Agreement,”125 the “EU Sea Borders 
Regulation,”126 the “European Agenda on Migration,”127 the “EU-
Turkey Joint Action Plan,”128 and more recently the European Council 
Strategic Agenda 2019–24,129 migration policy frameworks in the EU 
have “increasingly moved from intergovernmental decision making to 
EU competence.”130 Before 2015 when the migrant crisis reached 
historic levels, the Maastricht Treaty in particular had completely 
changed the way migration matters were governed in Europe following 
the introduction of a common asylum system. Post 2015, the EU states’ 
response to movement of nationals of third countries to Europe has 
been conducted at the broadest level from either, and sometimes a 
combination of, two policy bases: the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) inclusive of the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) and the migration policies (non-CSFP) as well as other areas 
of the EU external relations legal framework.131 The CFSP matches an 
idea of foreign policy pursued at the intergovernmental level through 
the Council of the European Union and the European Council while 
the non-CFSP parallels migration and other goals pursued at 
supranational level through EU institutions.132  
 There has also been a series of other policy measures adopted by 
the EU prior to, and in the wake of, the growing human tragedies in 
the Mediterranean Sea to respond to the crisis. The first is the Global 
Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), which defines some 
strategic policy priorities under which the EU engages in its external 
policy dialogue with third countries. It applies to facilitating human 
mobility and authorised migration, tackling irregular migration and 
trafficking in humans, promoting transnational protection, improving 
external asylum policy, as well as harnessing the development benefits 
of human migration.133 The second is the Bilateral and Regional 
 
123. See Consolidated Texts of the EU Treaties as Amended by the Treaty of 
Lisbon, Jan. 2008, CM 7310. 
124. Commission Regulation 604/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 180) (EC). 
125. The Schengen Agreement, 1985 O.J. (L 239).  
126. Commission Regulation 656/2014, 2014 O.J. (L 189). 
127. A European Agenda on Migration, supra note 74, at 2. 
128. Council of the EU Press Release 144/16, EU-Turkey Statement (Mar. 18, 
2016) [hereinafter EU-Turkey Statement]. For legal analysis of the EU-Turkey Action 
and its impact on migration to the EU, see generally Roman Lehner, The EU-Turkey 
Deal: Legal Challenges and Pitfalls, 57 INT’L MIGRATION 176 (2019). 
129. The European Council, A New Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 (June 2019). 
130. Attia et al., supra note 122, at 4. 
131. See Graham Butler, Legal Responses to the European Union’s Migration 
Crisis, 19 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 277, 279 (2018). 
132. See id. 
133. See The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, COM (2011) 743 final 
(Nov. 18, 2011); see also General Secretariat of the Council, Council Conclusions on the 
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, Council Document, SEC (2012) 9417 note 
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Frameworks for Dialogue and Cooperation (BRFDC). The BRFDC is 
designed to implement the GAMM through regional dialogue in order 
to enhance and facilitate the regular channels for movements of 
nationals of the southern states of the Mediterranean and the EU, as 
well as dialoguing with the African Union, the Sahel countries,  
Ethiopia, and Somalia.134 The third is the EU Readmission 
Agreements (EURAs). The EURAs are the EU’s cooperation 
agreements with third countries aimed at facilitating the return of 
people to their origin countries or nationals of third countries to transit 
countries who are no longer legally permitted to reside in an EU 
state.135 The fourth is the Regional Protection Programmes (RPPs) 
which aims at strengthening the protection of refugees and enhancing 
asylum capacity of third countries.136 And finally, there is the 
Exchange of Information with Third Countries Policy which is an 
initiative aimed at boosting information exchange with non-EU states 
in relation to migration governance and policy.137  
 Put together, these policy measures have been geared towards 
responding to the migrant crisis in four clearly identifiable ways. The 
first revolves around the need to save migrant lives at sea and borders, 
establish measures for “management, identification and repatriation 
of deceased migrant bodies,”138 and respect the human dignity and 
 
(May 29, 2012). See generally Directorate-General for External Policies, Migrants in the 
Mediterranean: Protecting Human Rights, EUR. PARLIAMENT 1, 47–55 (Oct. 29, 2015), 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/535005/EXPO_STU(2015)
535005_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/9V3M-QTES] (archived Mar. 16, 2021). 
134. See A Dialogue for Migration, Mobility and Security with the Southern 
Mediterranean Countries, at 3, COM (2011) 292 final (May 24, 2011); see also Managing 
the Refugee Crisis: State of Play of the Implementation of the Priority Actions Under the 
European Agenda on Migration, at 7, COM (2015) 510 final (Oct. 14, 2015); Directorate-
General for External Policies, supra note 133. 
135. See Marc Lilienkamp & Susan Saliba, EU Readmission Agreements: 
Facilitating the Return of Irregular Migrants, Briefing, Eur. Parliamentary Res. Serv., 
at 1 (Apr. 2015); Directorate-General for External Policies, supra note 133.  
136. On Regional Protection Programmes, COM (2005) 388 final (Jan. 9, 2005); see 
Directorate-General for External Policies, supra note 133. 
137. See Commission Regulation 493/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 141) 13; Directorate-
General for External Policies, supra note 133.  
138. Villagran, supra note 57, at 13–14. See generally M’charek & Casarelli, supra 
note 57 (discussing the forensic practices and challenges of identifying bodies washed 
ashore from the Mediterranean’s migration crisis); Robins, Migrant Bodies, supra note 
57 (discussing measures for identification, collection, and repatriation of dead bodies 
shipwrecked trying to enter the EU); Valentina Zagaria, Grave Situations: The 
Biopolitics and Memory of the Tombs of Unknown Migrants in the Agrigento Province 
(2012) (unpublished MA Thesis, Department of Anthropology, London School of 
Economics and Political Science) (cited in Iosif Kovras & Simon Robins, Missing 
Migrants: Deaths at Sea and Unidentified Bodies in Lesbos, in MIGRATING BORDERS AND 
MOVING TIMES: TEMPORALITY AND THE CROSSING OF BORDERS IN EUROPE 157, 160–63 
(Hastings Donnan, Madeleine Hurd & Carolin Leutloff-Grandits eds., 2017)); cf. Timothy 
P. Gocha, M. Katherine Spradley & Ryan Strand, Bodies in Limbo: Issues in 
Identification and Repatriation of Migrant Remains in South Texas, in SOCIOPOLITICS 
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rights of migrants (humanitarianism response). The second approach 
revolves around the policy of deterrence139 and combating illegal 
migration and migrant smuggling140 across international sea and EU 
borders in order to prevent deaths (securitisation response).141 The 
third approach is the EU decision to establish mechanisms for 
transnational cooperation with third states and states of first arrival 
in order to stem the tide of increasing migrant flows leading to 
avoidable deaths (externalisation response).142 And the fourth 
approach relates to the EU collective decision to establish a burden-
sharing responsibility regime between the EU and its member states 
in order to tackle the rising migrant flows into Europe (solidarity 
response).  
 It must be recognised that these response approaches were not 
specifically designed with missing migrants in mind; instead, they 
were designed to respond to migration flows into the EU more 
generally. It can therefore be rightly argued that the EU’s legal and 
policy responses to the transnational problem of missing migrants exist 
at the level of what Alexander Betts refers to as “embeddedness.”143 By 
embeddedness, it is meant that while these response approaches may 
not have been specifically designed to directly deal with the problem of 
missing migrants as such, EU legal and policy responses to the issue 
of missing migrants are nonetheless embedded in them and, as such, 
they also regulate, influence, and facilitate how states deal with the 
issue of missing migrants.144 Because of their centrality to the EU’s 
management of the migrant crisis and the problem of missing 
migrants, these response approaches are considered in more detail 
below. 
 
OF MIGRANT DEATH AND REPATRIATION 143 (Alyson J. O’Daniel & Krista E. Latham eds., 
2018). 
139. See Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, The Perfect Storm: Sovereignty Games and 
the Law and Politics of Boat Migration, in ‘BOAT REFUGEES’ AND MIGRANTS AT SEA: A 
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH 60, 60–61 (Violeta Moreno-Lax & Elfthymios Papastavridis 
eds., 2016). 
140. See Jean-Pierre Gauci & Patricia Mallia, The Migrant Smuggling Protocol 
and the Need for a Multi-faceted Approach: Intersectionality and Multi-actor 
Cooperation, in ‘BOAT REFUGEES’ AND MIGRANTS AT SEA: A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, 
supra note 139, at 117.  
141. See Daniel Ghezelbash, Violeta Moreno-Lax, Natalie Klein & Brian Oppeskin, 
Securitization of Search and Rescue at Sea: The Response to Boat Migration in the 
Mediterranean and Offshore Australia, 67 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 315, 315–51 (2018).  
142. See Andrea Terlizzi, Border Management and Migration Controls in Italy, 
(Univ. of Florence, Working Paper No. 17, 2019) (discussing these broad legal and policy 
responses in the context of border management and migration controls in Italy). 
143. Betts, Policy Primer, supra note 36, at 3 (referring to migration governance 
at the level of “embeddedness” as a situation whereby “a range of institutions exist that 
may not be explicitly labelled as migration institutions, but nevertheless regulate and 
facilitate states’ responses to migration”). 
144. See id.  
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A. Humanitarianism Response 
 At the EU level, humanitarian responses to the problem of 
migrant deaths and migrants going missing in transnational migration 
have been expressed and interpreted in different ways by scholars.145 
While some believe that it is purely about saving lives and providing 
aid and relief to those suffering human catastrophes, others believe 
that it extends to protection of human rights more generally, especially 
promotion of human wellbeing.146 Nonetheless, whether viewed from 
the traditional perspective of saving lives and ending human suffering 
or viewed from the broader perspective of protecting human rights, 
humanitarianism would ultimately underlie the “fundamental belief in 
the value of human life and dignity and in the moral imperative to 
protect and relieve suffering in the wake of natural disasters or man-
made crises.”147 In light of the migrant crisis and in what appears to 
be an allusion to the life-saving humanitarian goal of states, Stierl 
argues that framing migration governance in Europe as purely 
humanitarian requires adopting military-humanitarian measures in 
response to migrant deaths at the high sea if further drownings of boat 
migrants are to be prevented.148 For the EU, operationalising 
humanitarianism has to inevitably involve its member states adopting 
measures to contain risky boat migration and irregular border 
crossings in the first place so as to prevent unnecessary loss of migrant 
lives at sea and borders.  
 According to Carling and Hernández-Carretero, the humanitarian 
life-saving response is operationalised in two ways: the first is 
preventing and dissuading migrants from embarking on life-
threatening journeys in the first place; and the second is using 
surveillance capacity to rescue those already in distress at sea.149 The 
Italian Mare Nostrum policy and the EU’s Triton operation were both 
 
145. See, e.g., BRITISH RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS 
(ICRC), RED CROSS EU OFFICE, SWEDISH RED CROSS & SWISS RED CROSS, 
HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES OF FAMILY SEPARATION AND PEOPLE GOING MISSING 6–
44 (Nina Piquer & Maite Zamacona Aguirre eds., 2019) (perspectives of British & EU 
Red Cross organizations on the humanitarian consequences of family separation due to 
war and migration and how to best address these consequences). 
146. See Paolo Cuttitta, The Central Mediterranean Border as a Humanitarianism 
Space, in WHEN HUMAN WELFARE MEETS THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY AGENDAS: 
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON HUMANITARIANISM 15, 18 (Ninna Nyberg Sørensen & Sine 
Plambech eds., 2019). 
147. Ninna Nyberg Sørensen & Sine Plambech, Introduction to WHEN HUMAN 
WELFARE MEETS THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY AGENDAS: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
HUMANITARIANISM, supra note 146, at 5, 6. 
148. See Maurice Stierl, A Fleet of Mediterranean Border Humanitarians, 50 
ANTIPODE 704, 704 (2018). 
149. See Jørgen Carling & María Hernández-Carretero, Protecting Europe and 
Protecting Migrants? Strategies for Managing Unauthorised Migration from Africa, 13 
BRIT. J. POL. & INT’L RELS. 42, 45 (2011). 
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aimed at rescuing and saving the lives of numerous stranded migrants 
in the Mediterranean Sea and capture the latter understanding.150 
Beyond these two humanitarian operationalisation strategies, it is 
argued that the humanitarian life-saving goal of states extends to 
management of migrant bodies, although, Tamara Last contends that 
what happens to migrant bodies in Europe is very much in the dark as 
it has never been included in any EU migration policy agenda.151 The 
imperatives of the management of dead bodies, whether in war or 
migration contexts, are deeply rooted in international humanitarian 
law as expressed in the four Geneva Conventions (GCs) of 1949.152 The 
GCs obligate states to prevent people from going missing,153 search for 
those missing in war, recover their bodies if confirmed dead, and reach 
out to their families.154  
 The humanitarian response of the EU and EU states to dead body 
management through their policies and laws is no trivial matter to 
consider because experts generally agree that migrant mortalities 
arising from unsafe, disorderly, and irregular migration across seas 
and border zones are inevitable outcomes of migration. In the current 
literature on management of migrant bodies, M’charek and Black 
canvass the point that when migrants are reported dead in migration 
and their bodies are found, the dead bodies have to be engaged with as 
 
150. Paolo Cuttitta, Delocalisation, Humanitarianism, and Human Rights: The 
Mediterranean Border Between Exclusion and Inclusion, 50 ANTIPODE 783 (2017) 
(discussing extensively the life-saving and humanitarian goal of the Italian 
government’s Mare Nostrum policy from the perspective of delocalized inclusive 
humanitarianism). 
151. See Tamara Last, Who is the ‘Boat Migrant’? Challenging the Anonymity of 
Death by Border-Sea, in ‘BOAT REFUGEES’ AND MIGRANTS AT SEA: A COMPREHENSIVE 
APPROACH, supra note 139, at 79, 79–80. 
152. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention), adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter GC I]; Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 
(Second Geneva Convention), adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force Oct. 
21, 1950) [hereinafter GC II]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
(Third Geneva Convention), adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force 
Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter GC III]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 
287 (entered into force 21 October 1950) [hereinafter GC IV]. 
153. See GC I, supra note 152, arts. 16–17; GC II, supra note 152, arts. 19–20; GC 
III, supra note 152, arts. 122–24; GC IV, supra note 152, arts. 136–41; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) arts. 32–33, adopted June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter AP I]. 
154. See GC I, supra note 152, arts. 15–17; GC II, supra note 152, arts. 18–20; GC 
III, supra note 152, arts 120–21; GC IV, supra note 152, art. 16; AP I, supra note 153, 
arts. 33–34; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) 
art. 8, adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) 
[hereinafter AP II]. 
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a matter of care, dignity, and respect.155 This is in order to produce 
proximity with the dead and establish ways of counting and accounting 
for deaths during migration.156 The belief that death is inevitable when 
migrants are allowed to make the transnational journeys across the 
seas has often prompted EU states and politicians to argue that part 
of the humanitarian obligation of states in response to the migrant 
crisis is to first and foremost secure the border and stop the boats in 
order to prevent further loss of lives.157  
 It is apparently unclear what is the exact nature of the perceived 
relationship between humanitarianism and border control policies for 
purposes of responding to human disappearances through migration. 
It is also unclear whether the effect of this relationship prevents the 
realisation of the humanitarian objective of saving lives. Literature has 
only explored the relationship between humanitarianism, security, 
and human rights on the broadest level. For example, Little and 
Vaughan-Williams contend that the humanitarian imperatives of 
saving lives at sea whilst at the same time controlling and policing 
state borders represent an overlapping point where humanitarianism 
and securitisation response approaches often get entangled.158 Franko 
and Gundhus159 and Nina Perkowski160 admit that there is now a 
growing convergence of doctrines of humanitarianism, security, and 
human rights in the European border governance, although these 
scholars are not very explicit as to whether this convergence could have 
any adverse effect on the realisation of the life-saving goal of 
humanitarianism. Regardless of whether or not the so-called 
entanglement and/or convergence enhances or stymies the realisation 
of the humanitarian goal of saving migrant lives, it is still nonetheless 
hard to accept that the current humanitarian legal regime in the world 
allows for unhindered humanitarian assistance to migrants facing 
threats to their lives without being caught up in the inherent risk of 
breaching existing national criminal laws prohibiting migrant 
smuggling and sheltering of irregular migrants.161 Scholars are more 
 
155. See Amade M’charek & Julia Black, Engaging Bodies as a Matter of Care: 
Counting and Accounting for Death During Migration, in BORDER DEATHS: CAUSES, 
DYNAMICS AND CONSEQUENCES OF MIGRATION-RELATED MORTALITY, supra note 61, at 
85. 
156. See id. 
157. See Adrian Little & Nick Vaughan-Williams, Stopping Boats, Saving Lives, 
Securing Subjects: Humanitarian Borders in Europe and Australia, 23 EUR. J. INT’L 
RELS. 533, 533 (2017). 
158. See id. 
159. See Katja Franko Aas & Helene O.I. Gundhus, Policing Humanitarian 
Borderlands: Frontex, Human Rights and the Precariousness of Life, 54 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY, no. 6, 2014, at 1, 1. 
160. See Nina Perkowski, Frontex and the Convergence of Humanitarianism, 
Human Rights and Security, 49 SEC. DIALOGUE 457, 457 (2018). 
161. See Shalini Bhargava Ray, Saving Lives, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1225, 1226 (2017). 
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likely to agree that the humanitarian responses of states to missing 
migrants are expressed in various ways and forms that include, but are 
not limited to, legitimisation of state interventions at sea, border 
controls (border humanitarianism), as well as adoption of surveillance 
technologies (securitisation) and other operational responses162 to 
migrant flows.    
B. Securitisation Response 
 How does securitisation as a response measure prevent loss of 
lives or migrants going missing in transnational migration, some may 
ask? For states, the answer should be simple: secure the sea and 
borders by deploying security apparatuses of states and those of 
regional authorities, like the EU, to police and regulate the 
unauthorised journeys of migrants often ending in tragic deaths at the 
high sea and other spaces of migration. Although, Ghezelbash et al 
criticises the EU’s securitised response to people facing perils at sea for 
compromising the humanitarian objective of search and rescue in the 
name of maintaining border security,163 for the EU and other states, 
the basic premise of securitisation remains that securitising migration 
routes will dissuade and deter migrants from even attempting or 
making the deadly life-taking journeys in the first place. So, 
securitisation could be understood or conceived of as a preventive 
response measure. However, as highlighted above, the framing of 
human events through the lens of securitisation is increasingly 
becoming more pervasive in society than ever before,164 and the 
deployment of securitisation techniques to govern “precarious lives” 
such as migrants is not left out.165 As argued by Bigo, “[m]igration is 
increasingly interpreted as a security problem”166 in which the 
irregular migrants are viewed as an “element of insecurity”.167   
 The securitisation theory first appeared in the literature of the 
Copenhagen School of Critical Security Studies in the mid-1990s. This 
School viewed securitisation as a form of “speech act” or linguistic 
 
162. In support, see Polly Pallister-Wilkins, The Humanitarian Politics of 
European Border Policing: Frontex and Border Police in Evros, 9 INT’L POL. SOCIO. 53, 
54 (2015). 
163. See Ghezelbash, Moreno-Lax, Klein & Oppeskin, supra note 141, at 315. 
164. See generally ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, LIQUID FEAR (2006).  
165. Luca Mavelli, Governing Populations Through the Humanitarian 
Government of Refugees: Biopolitical Care and Racism in the European Refugee Crisis, 
43 REV. INT’L STUD. 809, 809 (2017). 
166. Didier Bigo, Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the 
Governmentality of Unease, 27 ALTERNATIVES 63, 63 (2002). 
167. Susana Ferreira, From Narratives to Perceptions in the Securitisation of the 
Migratory Crisis in Europe, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MIGRATION IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 57, 59 (Marianna Karakoulaki, Laura Southgate & Jakob Steiner eds., 
2018). 
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representation that designated some particular issues “such as 
irregular migration” as existential security threats.168 Viewed from 
this perspective, securitisation in relation to migration becomes a 
response approach that is informed by some underlying factors. The 
first is the expression of fear/anxiety amongst national citizens that 
their national governments are unable to control irregular migration 
flows and, therefore, states attempt to allay such fears by taking firm 
actions in the face of adversity and threats to security of their 
citizens.169 Second, the fact that irregular/unauthorised migrants 
carry no identity documents throughout their journeys is always a 
point of reference when framing insecurity to citizens.170 Third, at the 
supranational level, institutional decision-making, especially within 
the EU, is often dominated by increased debates on security matters 
whereby security is presented as the most viable and common 
consensus agenda of EU member states.171 For Waever, this has 
turned the EU into a security actor172 in matters of migration, and this 
is reflected in the European Council Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 
seeking to protect EU citizens against security threats posed by illegal 
migration.173  
 According to Kochenov and Amtenbrink, the prioritisation of 
security objectives by the EU and its institutions has significantly 
changed the migration governance approaches of its neighbours in 
ways that enable enactment of stricter policies.174 On the institutional 
level, law enforcement agencies of states deploy their security 
apparatuses or surveillance tools to police human mobility to such 
extent that, as Foucault argued, security becomes biopoliticised.175 
Thus, in securitisation terms, it can be argued that despite the seeming 
consensus among states about the legal and moral imperatives of 
preventing loss of lives at sea by securing and securitising the sea and 
borders, when it comes to migration, and specifically when the word 
 
168. Ole Wæver, Securitization and Desecuritization, in ON SECURITY 46, 52 
(Ronnie D. Lipschutz ed., 1995). See generally BARRY BUZAN, JAAP DE WILDE & OLE 
WÆVER, SECURITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS (1998). 
169. See Carling & Hernández-Carretero, supra note 149, at 44. 
170. Id. 
171. See Meng-Hsuan Chou, EU and the Migration-Development Nexus: What 
Prospects for EU-Wide Policies? 15–17 (Univ. of Oxford Ctr. on Migration, Pol’y & Soc’y, 
Working Paper No. 37, 2006). 
172. Ole Wæver, The EU as a Security Actor: Reflections from a Pessimistic 
Constructivist on Post-Sovereign Security Orders, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 
AND THE POLITICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: POWER, SECURITY AND COMMUNITY 250 
(Morten Kelstrub & Michael C. Williams eds., 2000). 
173. See A New Strategic Agenda 2019-2024, supra note 129. 
174. See THE EUROPEAN UNION’S SHAPING OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER  
280 (Dimitry Kochenov & Fabian Amtenbrink eds., 2014). 
175. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION: 
LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1977-1978 (Michel Senellart ed., Graham 
Burchell trans., Palgrave Macmillan 2009). 
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“migrant” or “refugee” is mentioned, the humanitarian imperative to 
save lives provokes not so much moral sympathy as it does fear, 
suspicion, and antipathy. Thus, states, in an attempt to allay such 
fears, seek to securitise migration, often in the form of driving migrants 
back to clandestine routes that increase the risk of loss of lives instead 
of saving lives. It is submitted that, in the same vein, migrant bodies 
are also often implicitly framed by the EU and EU states as a threat to 
the moral security and conscience of Europe—the impression that it is 
a dent on the image and identity of a democratically professed 
Europe176—and thus, it requires an urgent response from states to 
change the narrative.  
 The tensions, fear, and suspicion that irregular migration often 
ignites in the collective psyche of national citizens and societies 
increases the tendency of states to label such journeys as a security 
risk. Given the tendency of state authorities to label migrant journeys 
as a security threat, Bigo’s notion of “governmentality of unease”177 
and Huysmans’s notion of “politics of insecurity”178 both warn us not 
to leave uncritical the process through which events as migration are 
framed as a security threat directly or indirectly.179 This is because the 
“popularity of this security prism is not an expression of traditional 
responses to a rise of insecurity, crime, terrorism, and the negative 
effects of globalisation; it is the result of the creation of a continuum of 
threats and general unease in which many different actors exchange 
their fears and beliefs in the process of making a risky and dangerous 
society.”180 It is contended that the governmental problematisation 
and exceptionalisation of migration by the EU and EU states as a 
security issue that is serious and alarming, followed by adoption of 
securitised techniques to control and police migrants during their 
perilous journeys, is more likely to lead to migrant deaths and 
 
176. Compare Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina saying that illegal 
migrants taint the national image. Bangladesh PM Says Illegal Migrants Taint National 
Image, BBC NEWS (May 14, 2015), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-32867221 
[https://perma.cc/84WK-5NPQ] (archived Jan. 15, 2021). 
177. See Bigo, supra note 166, at 63; Didier Bigo, Globalised-In-Security: The Field 
and the Ban-Opticon, in TRANSLATION, BIOPOLITICS, COLONIAL DIFFERENCE 109 (Naoki 
Sakai & Jon Solomon eds., 2006); Didier Bigo, Globalised (In)security: The Field and the 
Ban-Opticon, in TERROR, INSECURITY AND LIBERTY: ILLIBERAL PRACTICES OF LIBERAL 
REGIMES AFTER 9/11 10 (Didier Bigo & Anastassia Tsoukala eds., 2008). 
178. JEF HUYSMANS, THE POLITICS OF INSECURITY: FEAR, MIGRATION AND ASYLUM 
IN THE EU 1–2 (2006) (ebook). 
179. See Jef Huysmans, The European Union and the Securitization of Migration, 
38 J. COMMON MKT STUD. 751 (2000). 
180. Didier Bigo, Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the 
Governmentality of Unease, 27 ALTS.: GLOB., LOC., POL. 63, 63 (2002); cf. Ilse Van Liempt 
& Stephanie Sersli, State Responses and Migrant Experiences with Human Smuggling: 
A Reality Check, 45 ANTIPODE 1029, 1029 (2013). 
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migrants going missing at securitised sea and border spaces than 
saving lives.181  
 The designation of boat migrants as figures of fear, and their 
framing as security threats, often comes at an enormous human cost 
and may further widen the patterns or structures of exclusion of 
migrants from legal protection and/or access to legal migration routes. 
The framing of the migrant as a security threat has contributed to and 
is highly likely to continue to contribute to the steady rise in the 
number of border-related deaths. Closely related to the states’ 
securitisation response to migration is the practice of institutionalised 
externalisation. Per this practice, the EU and EU destination states 
attempt to set up structures abroad to assist states located in the 
spaces of origin and transit to control migration and prevent migrants 
from undertaking risky and life-taking transborder journeys in the 
first place. 
C. Externalisation Response 
 Externalisation response is a preemptive or presumptive control 
of migration182 whereby states adopt a range of measures and practices 
from extension of border controls abroad to other broader measures 
that are targeted at tackling the drivers of migration.183 Although 
externalisation has been a policy of the EU and EU states for decades 
now,184 it turned into a matter of serious debate in the wake of the 
migrant crisis marked by increased migrant drownings and deaths at 
sea and the borders of the EU. It implies a situation whereby states 
and regional supranational bodies like the EU and its member states 
seek to strike deals with third states (deemed safe third states), mostly 
origin, transit, and states of first arrival, to act as border guards in 
order to control flow of migrants into their territories.185 Through such 
 
181. Cf. Helen Hintjens, Failed Securitization Moves During the 2015 ‘Migration 
Crisis,’ 57 INT’L MIGRATION 181 (2019). 
182. Martin Lemberg-Pedersen, Losing the Right to Have Rights: EU 
Externalization of Border Control, in EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS: TRANSATLANTIC 
APPROACHES TO HUMAN RIGHTS 393, 398 (Erik André Andersen & Eva Maria Lassen 
eds., 2015). 
183. Inka Stock, Ayşen Üstübici & Susanne U. Schultz, Externalization at Work: 
Responses to Migration Policies from the Global South, 7 COMPAR. MIGRATION STUD. 1, 1 
(2019). 
184. Synnøve K.N. Bendixsen, The Refugee Crisis: Destabilizing and Restabilizing 
European Borders, 27 HIST. & ANTHROPOLOGY 536 (2016).  
185. See Ayşen Ustübici, The Impact of Externalized Migration Governance on 
Turkey: Technocratic Migration Governance and the Production of Differentiated Legal 
Status, 7 COMP. MIGRATION STUD. 1, 1 (2019); see also Sarah Katz, A More Acceptable 
Solution: The Proposed European Union Agency of Asylum and Refugees 49 CASE W. RES. 
J. INT’L L. 303, 310 (2017); Bill Frelick, Ian M. Kysel & Jennifer Podkul, The Impact of 
Externalization of Migration Controls on the Rights of Asylum Seekers and Other 
Migrants, 4 J. MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 190, 193–94 (2016). 
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externalisation practices, states attempt to buy the executive and 
legislative policy-making competences of third states in order to 
prevent or intercept migrants from arriving at destination states, all 
in the belief that such measures have the capacity to reduce migrant 
deaths and going missing through migration. Nora Markard for 
example, believes that the externalised practice of coastal states acting 
in the interest of EU destination states to prevent migrant departures 
by sea serves at least two key purposes: first, to restrict border crossing 
that stops unauthorised migrants from entering the EU; and second, 
to prevent smuggling through the sea in order to “protect the life and 
health of migrants generally.”186  
 While some scholars have argued that externalisation policies are 
a justifiable measure to prevent migrant deaths and migrants going 
missing at sea and borders, others contend that such actions are a 
direct result of ineffectiveness and politicisation of national migration 
policies.187 It is argued that although interpreting externalisation as a 
measure to prevent migrant deaths may have a legal basis under any 
law obligating states to protect lives, such measures could not be used 
to justify interception of migrants who are genuinely fleeing conflict, 
violence, and persecution in their states of origin as it could violate the 
nonrefoulement obligation of states under international refugee law. 
Although framing migrant drownings and deaths at sea and borders of 
states as a violation of international law has never been a 
straightforward task,188 it is also true that the failure to frame it as 
such, at least within the meaning of the right to life, will not assist in 
bridging the current accountability gap in the international legal 
frameworks relating to the issue of missing migrants. In the 
circumstances, it is suggested that a delicate balance needs to be struck 
between the so-called humanitarian obligation of saving lives at sea 
through the measure of externalisation and the obligation of states to 
respect, protect, and fulfil the rights of migrants to leave territories 
threatening their lives and to seek protection in other territories. It 
could be claimed that striking this balance requires solidarity, 
partnership, and greater cooperation between states at both the 
national and international levels of policy making and implementation, 
more so, as some migration scholars have argued, that response to 
migration flows through externalisation facilitates solidarity between 
EU member states.189 
 
186. Nora Markard, The Right to Leave by Sea: Legal Limits on EU Migration 
Control by Third Countries, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 591, 602 (2016). 
187. See, e.g., Frelick, Kysel & Podkul, supra note 185, at 193–94. 
188. Itamar Mann, The Right to Perform Rescue at Sea: Jurisprudence and 
Drowning, 21 GERMAN L.J. 598, abstract (2020) [hereinafter Mann, Right to Perform]. 
189. Martin Lemberg-Pedersen, Solidarity (In)action?, 14 TIDSSKRIFTET POLITIK 
[MAGAZINE POL.] 27, 28 (2011). 
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D. Solidarity Response 
 It can be argued that the transnational problem of missing 
migrants is a crisis of solidarity.190 For Brändle et al, the refugee crisis 
was not only a litmus test for EU solidarity but also a reflection of the 
solidarity gap between member state actors due to the seeming 
exclusive application and interpretations of the notion of solidarity 
among its member states.191 This would of course be a major source of 
concern for states, given that implementation of these response 
approaches is governed by the understanding that all states must join 
hands together to solve the problem at hand; therefore, implementing 
the core principle of solidarity encapsulated in “EU founding 
documents”192 is a pathway forward in this regard. Literature 
recognises that in many EU states, the migrant crisis is widely framed 
as a European problem and not one of any particular state and, 
therefore, should be dealt with through solidarity of EU member 
states,193 even though policies on irregular migration differ widely 
across EU member states194 and state responses to missing migrants 
have been largely determined by national law and practice.195 
Nonetheless, solidarity response remains a consensus understanding 
amongst states that suggests that it is required to deal with increasing 
cases of people going missing in migration.  
 For example, the New York Declaration for Refugees and 
Migrants, adopted by the UN in 2016, captures this consensus of states 
when stating “we acknowledge a shared responsibility to manage large 
 
190. See Ban Ki-moon, Refugees and Migrants: A Crisis of Solidarity, UNITED 
NATIONS UNIV. (Dec. 8, 2020), https://unu.edu/publications/articles/refugees-and-
migrants-a-crisis-of-solidarity.html#info [https://perma.cc/K3YJ-VKB5] (archived Jan. 
19, 2021) (arguing that the migrant crisis is not a crisis of numbers but a crisis of 
solidarity); cf. Marianne Takle, Is the Migration Crisis a Solidarity Crisis?, in THE CRISIS 
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 116, 116–29 (Andreas Grimmel ed., 2018) (asking a similar 
question if the Europe migrant crisis could in fact be a crisis of solidarity). 
191. Verena K. Brändle, Olga Eisele & Hans-Jörg Trenz, Contesting European 
Solidarity During the ‘Refugee Crisis’: A Comparative Investigation of Media Claims 
Making in Denmark, Germany, Greece and Italy, 22 MASS COMM. & SOC’Y. 708 (2019); cf. 
ÓSCAR GARCÍA AGUSTÍN & MARTIN BAK JØRGENSEN, SOLIDARITY AND THE REFUGEE 
CRISIS IN EUROPE 1–21 (2019). 
192. See, for example, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 80, 
2007 O.J. (C 202) 78 (TFEU, otherwise known as the Lisbon Treaty), which provides that 
migration policies shall be “governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of 
responsibility.” See also id. art. 67, 2007 O.J. (C 202) 73. 
193. Francesco Pasetti & Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas, Who is Responsible, for What 
and to Whom? Patterns of Politicisation on Refugees and the European Solidarity Crisis 
12 (Ceaseval, Working Paper No. 16, 2018). 
194. ANNA TRIANDAFYLLIDOU, UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION: COUNTING THE 
UNCOUNTABLE. DATA AND TRENDS ACROSS EUROPE 18 (2009),  https://cordis.europa.eu/
docs/results/44/44103/126625701-6_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/CHR5-E8JR] (archived Jan. 
21, 2021).  
195. GRANT, supra note 57, at 4. 
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movements of refugees and migrants in a humane, sensitive, 
compassionate and people-centred manner.”196 That is to say, 
“protecting the safety, dignity and human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of all migrants, regardless of their migratory status, at all 
times.”197 However, with the framing of the migrant crisis as a crisis of 
solidarity in current literature,198 it can be argued that the missing 
migrants’ problem remains a matter for serious debate at the national 
and EU level. This is particularly with regard to whether the principle 
of solidarity would ever work when it comes to investigation of migrant 
deaths, search and rescue of seaborne migrants, and identification and 
repatriation of migrant bodies to their families. 
E. On the Effectiveness of the EU Response Measures and Policies 
 The lack of a specific and direct EU response to the issue of 
missing migrants means that “what happens to the bodies of dead 
migrants in the Mediterranean is very much in the dark; [as] it has . . . 
never been on any national or EU institution’s agenda.”199 As can be 
observed from the foregoing analysis of the four response measures, 
the closest the policies came to addressing the problem of missing 
migrants was the declaration made by EU states in the European 
Agenda on Migration pledging to rescue and save lives at sea200—a 
step that may be perceived as crucial to enforcing migrants’ human 
dignity, in particular their right to life and security. That step towards 
effective implementation of the policy succeeded in rescuing and saving 
hundreds of lives in the Mediterranean Sea before the EU turned its 
back to further implementation.  
 The next most effective EU policy after the European Agenda is 
the “EU Triton”201 rescue mission, which was initiated as part of the 
 
196. See generally G.A. Res. 71/1, New York Declaration for Refugees and 
Migrants, pmbl. ¶ 11 (Sept. 19, 2016). . 
197. See id. pmbl. ¶ 41. 
198. See Jean-Pierre Gauci & Eleni Karageorgiou, Solidarity “A La Carte”: The 
EU’s Response to Boat Migration, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 9, 2019), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2019/08/09/solidarity-a-la-carte-the-eus-response-to-boat-migratio
n/ [https://perma.cc/7X5D-LHDC] (archived Jan. 21, 2021). 
199. Last, supra note 139, at 79–80.  
200. See A European Agenda on Migration, supra note 74, at 2. 
201. In November 2014, the Triton rescue program (heavily criticised by experts 
and international organisations for its ineffectiveness) was launched by the EU to be 
implemented by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation 
at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU (Frontex). See Amnesty 
International’s “Blueprint for Action” to End Refugee and Migrant Deaths in the Med, 
AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/
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the-med/ [https://perma.cc/W9UF-P9S2] (archived Jan. 21, 2021); cf. A Safer Sea: The 
Impact of the Increased Search and Rescue Operations in the Central Mediterranean, 
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non-CFSP policy. The Triton policy implemented through “Frontex”202 
is more of a preventive effort to reduce migrant deaths at sea, police 
the Mediterranean coast, and clamp down on the activities of people 
smugglers. At the member-state level, Italy way back in October 2013, 
in the aftermath of the boat mishap that greeted its island of 
Lampedusa, launched the “Operation Mare Nostrum (OMN)”203 rescue 
mission. The programme was aimed at search and rescue of migrants 
trapped in the Mediterranean Sea, and it was widely regarded as a 
huge success. The operation alone had rescued well over one hundred 
thousand migrants stranded in the high sea204 (with many other 
sources putting the figures at around one hundred fifty thousand)205 
while also assisting in the arrest of 330 people smugglers in 421 
operations just within the first year of the program’s implementation 
by the Italian government. The Mare Nostrum program also rendered 
crucial legal and humanitarian assistance to people in serious need. 
The problem, however, was that the Italian government, in agreement 
with the EU,206 was forced to end the program in October 2014 as it 
was costing the European country over €9 million per month.207 This 
situation was worsened by a lack of coordinated support to Italy from 
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Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast 
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25/world/europe/europes-migration-crisis-cannot-be-solved-at-sea-analysts-say.html [ht
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other European states. So, other than the positive effects of the 
European Agenda on Migration and Triton rescue policy and Italy’s 
Operation Mare Nostrum, the policies have generally not been effective 
when it comes to addressing cases of migrant deaths and migrants 
going missing in transnational migration.  
 There are numerous factors that may account for this 
ineffectiveness. First, while there may be acceptable legal and political 
rationales for the EU in adopting the various policy measures, the 
practical approaches to enforcement of the policies appear to shift focus 
away from the intended public goals described earlier against which 
the transnational effectiveness of the policies can be measured. For 
example, the role played by diverse surveillance technologies,208 push-
back operations,209 and border policing (including clamp down on 
activities of migrant smugglers in the Mediterranean) may have all 
contributed to migrant deaths210  at sea and borders rather than saving 
lives. Second, there is no regional or global decision-making process 
that is so consistently certain, predictable, and effective as to command 
the same level of authority and compliance as would a national policy 
governance system where there is a sovereign, authoritative decision 
maker capable of enforcing compliance. As a result, at the EU and 
global level “the ‘ownership’ of public problems is often characterized 
by a policy vacuum.”211 As there is no such thing as a regional or global 
state, implementation of transnational policies is often predicated on 
the implicit, sometimes misleading, assumption that states will 
comply, cooperate, recognise, or act in a manner not inconsistent with 
the objectives and aspirations pursued through such policies. Third is 
the issue of lack of political will on the part of EU states212 and the EU 
 
208. See generally Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert, Control or Rescue at Sea? Aims and 
Limits of Border Surveillance Technologies in the Mediterranean Sea, 42 DISASTERS 674 
(2018).  
209. See generally Giuffré, supra note 119. 
210. Grant, Recording and Identifying, supra note 121, at 135–56; Bialasiewicz, 
supra note 121, at 843–66; Thomas Spijkerboer, Moving Migrants, States and Rights: 
Human Rights and Border Deaths, 7 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 213 (2013); Özgün E. Topak, 
The Biopolitical Border in Practice: Surveillance and Death at the Greece-Turkey 
Borderzones, 32 ENV’T & PLAN. D: SOC’Y & SPACE 815 (2014); ROBINS, KOVRAS & 
VALLIANATOU, supra note 121, at 2–16; Iosif Kovras & Simon Robins, Missing Migrants: 
Deaths at Sea and Unidentified Bodies in Lesbos, in MIGRATING BORDERS AND MOVING 
TIMES: TEMPORALITY AND THE CROSSING OF BORDERS IN EUROPE 157, 160–63 (Hastings 
Donnan, Madeleine Hurd & Carolin Leutloff-Grandits eds., 2017). See generally 
TRIANDAFYLLIDOU & MAROUKIS, supra note 121. 
211. Diane Stone, Global Public Policy, Transnational Policy Communities, and 
Their Networks 13 (2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of 
Warwick Institutional Repository). 
212. See Jeremy Sarkin, Respecting and Protecting the Lives of Migrants and 
Refugees: The Need for a Human Rights Approach to Save Lives and Find Missing 
Persons, 22 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 207, 220, 222 (2018); see also Mann, Right to Perform, 
supra note 188, at 599 (arguing that European states have not shown the political 
willingness to put an end to preventable irregular migrant deaths at sea; instead, 
2021]                UK MIGRATION POLICIES 385 
 
 
as a body to implement the existing policies in such a way that would 
be relevant to addressing the problem of missing migrants.  
 And the fourth relates to the unresolved debates about the 
negative impacts that state migration policies are having on migrant 
journeys, and what legal and political steps states should take to deal 
with the problem transnationally. One view is that the high human 
cost of migration is a direct result of deterrent border control and 
externalisation policies of some states.213 It is also claimed that 
migrant deaths have significantly increased following migrants’ 
clandestine movements along the more treacherous routes as a 
reaction to tighter border controls.214 The stringent border controls 
mean that migrants are constrained to “patronise the services of people 
smugglers”215 who they believe will help them facilitate their 
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Against Migrants and Refugees at Europe’s Borders, AMNESTY INT’L 5, 20–29 (2014),  
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/EUR%20050012014_%20Fortress
%20Europe_complete_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FFT-69CN] (archived Jan. 21, 2021); 
JASON DE LEÓN, LAND OF OPEN GRAVES: LIVING AND DYING ON THE MIGRANT TRAIL 23–
37 (Robert Borofsky & Naomi Schneider eds., 2015); Peter Shields, The Human Cost of 
European Union’s External Border Regime, 27 PEACE REV.: J. SOC. JUST. 82, 82–90 
(2015); Didier Bigo, The (in)Securitization Practices of the Three Universes of EU Border 
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211–12 (2014); Charles Heller & Lorenzo Pezzani, Liquid Traces: Investigating the 
Deaths of Migrants at the EU’s Maritime Frontier, in THE BORDERS OF EUROPE: 
AUTONOMY OF MIGRATION, TACTICS OF BORDERING 657 (Nicholas De Genova ed., Duke 
Univ. Press 2017); Charles Heller & Lorenzo Pezzani, Ebbing and Flowing: The EU’s 
Shifting Practices of (Non-)Assistance and Bordering in a Time of Crisis, ZONE BOOKS 
NEAR FUTURES ONLINE 1, 1–13 (2016), http://nearfuturesonline.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/03/Heller_Pezzani_Ebbing_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UWW-KJCH] (archived 
Jan. 21, 2021); Sophie Hinger, Transformative Trajectories—The Shifting Mediterranean 
Border Regime and the Challenges of Critical Knowledge Production, 4 MOVEMENTS 193 
(2018). See generally G.A. Res. 71/198 (Aug. 15, 2017). In addition, United Against 
Refugee Deaths, a European network against nationalism, racism, fascism and in 
support of migrant and refugees have documented and attributed deaths of about 36,570 
migrants and refugees between 1993 and April 2019 to the restrictive policies of Fortress 
Europe. See Death by Policy: Time for Change!, UNITED FOR INTERCULTURAL ACTION 
(July 2019), http://www.unitedagainstracism.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Listof
DeathsActual.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2UG-AUVU] (archived Jan. 21, 2021). 
214. Thomas Spijkerboer, The Human Cost of Border Control, 9 EUR. J. MIGRATION 
& L. 127, 127–39 (2007) [hereinafter Spijkerboer, Human Cost of Border Control]; see 
also Spijkerboer, Are European States Responsible for Border Deaths?, supra note 104, 
at 63–66; Robyn Sampson, Does Detention Deter? Reframing Immigration Detention in 
Response to Irregular Migration, INT’L DETENTION COALITION, Apr. 2015, at 1, 4. 
215. See Wayne A. Cornelius, Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended 
Consequences of US Immigration Control Policy, 27 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 661 (2001); 
Wayne A. Cornelius, Controlling 'Unwanted' Immigration: Lessons from the United 
States, 1993-2004, 31 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 775 (2005); Derek Lutterbeck, 
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perfidious journeys and circumvent stringent border entry 
conditions—a development which not only increases existing death 
risks but also creates new ones.216 A different perception, however, 
contends that strict migration policies actually prevent migrants from 
going missing or risking death by deterring, dissuading, or 
discouraging migrants from embarking on risky and life-taking 
journeys in the first place.217 Adherents of this perspective suggest that 
migration policies such as the EU’s Operation Triton, which focuses on 
the search and rescue of migrants trapped at sea, operates as a 
“magnet”218 and “bridge to Europe”219 which tend to motivate more 
migrants to jump on unseaworthy boats leading to huge loss of lives. 
Thus, bringing the risks involved in deadly journeys to the knowledge 
and awareness of the migrants is believed to be a realistic way of 
curbing irregular migration and preventing unnecessary loss of lives.  
 Perspectives are also increasingly divergent as to what steps 
states should take or what measures should be adopted to prevent 
migrant deaths and migrants from going missing. One view is that the 
problem should be addressed from a “human rights perspective” with 
the utmost concern being protection and respect for the migrants’ 
rights to life and human dignity as encapsulated in international 
human rights law.220 This perspective supports the idea of rescue 
operations in the Mediterranean Sea and other migratory routes 
around the world where migrants may be trapped. Proponents of this 
view also argue that opening up more legal channels would drastically 
 
Policing Migration in the Mediterranean, 11 MEDITERRANEAN POL. 59 (2006); 
Spijkerboer, Human Cost of Border Control, supra note 214, at 127–39; Mathias Czaika 
& Hein De Haas, The Effectiveness of Immigration Policies, 39 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 
487, 503 (2013). 
216. See Maarten Den Heijer, Jorrit Rijpma & Thomas Spijkerboer, Coercion, 
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Asylum System, 53 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 607, 616–17 (2016). 
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the Control Gap Debate, 45 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 89 (2011); Jørgen Carling, Migration 
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Experiences, 28 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 5 (2002). 
218. See Nicholas Farrell, Italy is Killing Refugees with Kindness: The Mare 
Nostrum Policy Has Acted as a Magnet for Boat People; The Crisis Is Only Growing, 
SPECTATOR (Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.spectator.co.uk/2014/09/italys-decriminalising-
of-illegal-immigration-has-acted-as-a-green-light-to-boat-people/ [https://perma.cc/NL
3Q-PTS3] (archived Jan. 15, 2021).  
219. See Christoph Hasselbach, Opinion, Is Refugee Rescue Attracting More?, 
DEUTSCHE WELLE (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-is-refugee-rescue-
attracting-more/a-18026378 [https://perma.cc/38V4-8T67] (archived Jan. 15, 2021). See 
generally MARIANNE RIDDERVOLD, THE MARITIME TURN IN EU FOREIGN AND SECURITY 
POLICIES: AIMS, ACTORS AND MECHANISMS OF INTEGRATION (Palgrave Macmillan ed., 
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Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 2–3, adopted Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).  
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reduce deaths221 since migrants would not necessarily risk death if 
more channels of legal migration exist.222 An opposite view, however, 
stresses that state migration policies focusing on “search and rescue 
operations”223 tend to “encourag[e] more migrants to make the journey 
and lead to further deaths.”224 The direct result of these unresolved 
legal and political debates is escalation of the so-called Europe or 
Mediterranean migrant crisis.  
 According to Crawley et al, many years after the migrant crisis 
erupted, signs of a long-term coordinated response have yet to be 
seen.225 Issues connected to the crisis of migrant deaths and 
disappearances at sea and borders stem from a disconnect between the 
duties of national authorities and a policy void at the international and 
EU levels.226 The crisis poses a particular kind of challenge for 
transnational law and international decision-making. This is 
especially in regard to the multiplicity of perspectives as what should 
be the appropriate response of states to the problem (e.g., responses 
through legislations/law-making, policies, litigation/judicial strategies, 
or through consensus building and action plans).227  So, in light of the 
migrant crisis at hand marked by increased deaths and migrants going 
missing and the EU’s responses to it, what has been the United 
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TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B 599, 604 (2002); see also Mattia Toaldo, Libya’s 
Migrant Smuggling Highway: Lessons for Europe, EUR. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. 1, 8 
(Nov. 2015); cf. MATTHIAS M. MAYER & MEHRDAD MEHREGANI, VISION EUROPE SUMMIT: 
BEYOND CRISIS MANAGEMENT: THE PATH TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE, PRO-ACTIVE AND FAIR 
EUROPEAN REFUGEE POLICY 30, 34 (2016). 
223. At present, the obligation of states to rescue people facing distress at sea is 
still a subject of heated debate among scholars. See GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 157  (Clarendon Press 2nd ed. 1996) (arguing in favour of a duty 
to rescue); Seline Trevisanut, Is There a Right to be Rescued at Sea? A Constructive View, 
4 QUESTIONS INT’L L.  3, 3, 5–8 (2014) (arguing in favour of a duty to rescue and the right 
of individuals to be rescued); cf. Efthymios D. Papastavridis, Is There a Right to be 
Rescued at Sea? A Skeptical View, 4 QUESTIONS INT’L L. 17, 21, 23 (2014) (expressing a 
skeptical view about the duty of states to rescue and individual right to be rescued). 
224. Alan Travis, Migrant Rescue Operations Must Be Stopped at Earliest 
Opportunity-Minister, GUARDIAN (Oct. 30, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2014/oct/30/home-office-minister-rescue-migrants-must-be-stopped-mediterranea
n [https://perma.cc/WY4X-KTFZ] (archived Jan. 15, 2021).  
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MEDITERRANEAN MIGRATION IN 2015, FINAL REPORT 6 (2016). 
226. See Attia et al., supra note 122, at  3. 
227. See generally Bernard Ryan, The EU Migration Crisis and International Law 
(presented at Migrants’ Rights at a Crossroads: Seizing the Moment(um) of the UN 
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Kingdom’s policy response to the problem of missing migrants at the 
national level? Also, to what extent has such a response been 
transnationally effective? 
V.  POLICY RESPONSES TO MISSING MIGRANTS AT THE UK LEVEL AND 
THE QUESTION OF THEIR TRANSNATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS: WHAT WE 
KNOW SO FAR 
 A good way to start any discussion on the transnational policy 
responses to the problem of missing migrants at the state level is to 
first diagnose the wide variety of views held by states which may 
converge together and find expression at regional levels, such as the 
EU as discussed above. This is important because, as positional 
adherence theory228 holds, the most significant determinant of why 
states behave the way they do in the international system is the 
“position” that any state takes in regard to issues of transnational 
importance.229 First of all, for many of the migrants entering or seeking 
to enter the EU in search of refugee, the United Kingdom is their 
preferred final destination, but not all arrive.230 For example, a 2016 
study by the IOM about the top destination states for migrants moving 
across the Central Mediterranean route showed that the United 
Kingdom (6 percent), Italy (55 percent), Germany (9 percent) and 
France (3 percent) are among the top destination states for migrants 
fleeing wars and seeking refuge in Europe.231 In terms of migrant flows 
 
228. Positional theory of adherence seeks to understand state behaviour towards 
international legal regimes and why states adhere to them. According to the proponents 
Sarah Elizabeth Kreps and Anthony Clark Arend, the nature of a treaty regime, for 
example, as well as the extent to which the regime infringes on state sovereignty, 
normativity of the treaty regime, and enforcement arrangements of that regime all 
influence the decisions of states to behave in a particular way. See Sarah Elizabeth Kreps 
& Anthony Clark Arend, Why States Follow the Rules: Toward a Positional Theory of 
Adherence to International Legal Regimes, 16 DUKE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 331, 332, 404 
(2006). 
229. See id.  
230. See  Calais and Clandestine Migration into the UK: Concerns and Context, 
MIGRATION OBSERVATORY (Oct. 24, 2014), https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/
resources/commentaries/calais-and-clandestine-migration-into-the-uk-concerns-and-con
text/ [https://perma.cc/4KTV-SVSP] (archived Jan. 21, 2021); BASTIAN VOLLMER, 
BRIEFING: IRREGULAR MIGRATIONS IN THE UK: DEFINITIONS, PATHWAYS AND SCALE 
(Migration Observatory 2011); see also Duncan Leatherdale, Why Do People Risk Their 
Lives to Get to the UK?, BBC NEWS (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
england-50155073 [https://perma.cc/7SWF-N6VL] (archived Jan. 15, 2021). For 
example, the UK received the highest number of asylum applications in Europe in 2017 
behind Germany, Italy, France and Greece. See Migration to Europe in Charts, BBC 
NEWS (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-44660699 [https://
perma.cc/XCC5-9GUN]  (archived Jan. 15, 2021).  
231. See IOM, MIXED MIGRATION FLOWS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND BEYOND: 
FLOW MONITORING DATA ANALYSIS 9 (2016), https://migration.iom.int/docs/Analysis%20-
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by nationality, Eritreans fleeing conflicts in their own state of origin 
mentioned the United Kingdom (26 percent) as their intended 
destination and Germany (18 percent).232 Another study also showed 
that the United Kingdom is a priority destination for many migrants 
from African and Middle East states.233 These migrant flows require 
an effective UK transnational policy response. Generally, the United 
Kingdom’s national migration policymaking and enforcement in 
response to these transnational movements of migrants seeking to 
reach its shores covers a broad range of areas. These areas include, in 
particular, border controls and coastal policing, integration, legal 
entry, legal exit, and asylum processing procedures. Of these policy 
areas, evidence about the transnational effects of the UK national 
policy has been seen and felt more in the area of extraterritorial asylum 
processing than in any other.  
 For example, in 2004, the United Kingdom proposed the third 
country “transit processing centres” (TPCs) and “regional processing 
zones” (RPZs).234 The former is a policy that sought to transfer asylum 
seekers arriving in the United Kingdom and EU to transit processing 
centres in countries outside the EU where they would be kept until 
their claims were  processed and assessed. The proposal (later dropped 
following international criticisms)235 was widely believed to be an 
attempt by the United Kingdom and other participating EU states to 
deterritorialise refugee protection and stem the tide of spontaneous 
migrant arrivals in Europe. The TPC initiative was greatly inspired by 
the Australian “Pacific Solution.”236 The UNHCR subsequently came 
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https://missingchildreneurope.eu/Portals/0/Docs/publication%20hub/Comm%20channel
s%20used%20by%20migrants%20in%20Italy.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/GKX8-CDBR] 
(archived Jan. 15, 2021). 
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and UNHCR, 22 REFUGE: CANADIAN J. ON REFUGEES 58 (2004) [hereinafter Betts, 
International Relations]. 
235. See id. at 59–60 (dropping the TPC and pushing on with the RPZ idea).  
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Australian Navy were allowed to intercept irregular maritime arrivals and transfer them 
to offshore processing centres on Nauru and Manus Island in Papua New Guinea. See 
Janet Phillips, Background Note, The ‘Pacific Solution’ Revisited: A Statistical Guide to 
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Sept. 4, 2012, at 1, 2. 
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such because of the UNHCR’s belief that its own proposal is more 
consistent and compliant with the Refugee Convention and thus a plus 
to it) to counter the UK position. The Convention Plus sought to 
separate groups believed to be coming from countries that hardly 
produce any refugees and send them to reception facilities inside the 
EU where their asylum claims would be assessed by a joint team of the 
EU.238 The UK approach implies the country’s extraterritorial human 
rights obligations to migrants. Although there were credible 
arguments in several quarters that the motivations behind the UK 
proposals would give rise to negative outcomes (illegality and 
nonviability)239 and create potential conflict with international law,240 
they nonetheless demonstrate how migration policies initiated 
nationally can produce external effects abroad.  
 However, there is little or no equivalent evidence to explain the 
transnational effects of the United Kingdom’s policies in relation to 
dead and missing migrants. Understandably, the issue of missing 
migrants is connected with the wider question of migration more 
generally where the UK global migration governance position is 
“relatively fragmented.”241 In addition to the fragmented nature of UK 
global migration governance, the reason for this policy gap may also be 
linked to the earlier arguments about how best to deal with the crisis 
of missing migrants internationally. The United Kingdom appears to 
accept the idea that until migrants reach state territories, no state has 
any obligations and that they can only be in breach of human rights 
obligations if migrants go missing within their territorial jurisdiction. 
Again, the United Kingdom appears to accept the idea that state 
policies focusing on search and rescue operations at sea tend to 
“encourage[e] more migrants to make the journey and lead to further 
deaths”242 and migrants going missing. For example, in 2014, the UK 
government announced that it would not participate in future search 
and rescue operations of migrants trapped in the Mediterranean Sea, 
 
238. See Ruud Lubbers, Put an End to their Wandering, GUARDIAN (June 20, 
2003), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/jun/20/immigration.immigrationand
publicservices [https://perma.cc/H7WV-B2PJ] (archived Jan. 15, 2021).  
239. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNLAWFUL AND UNWORKABLE—AMNESTY 
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CLAIMS 1–37 (2003), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/108000/ior6100420
03en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3NF-9KLJ] (archived Jan. 15, 2021). 
240. Betts, International Relations, supra note 234, at 59–62. 
241. Betts, Policy Primer, supra note 36 (arguing that the UK current governance 
approach is fragmented because different government departments, such as the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development, Home Office 
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engaging with transnational migration and the different aspects of the global migration 
governance even though, in most cases, such fragmentation of responsibilities are unified 
through works of the Home Office). 
242. Travis, supra note 224.   
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owing to what it called the “pull factor” motivating a significant of 
migrants to make the risky sea crossings.243 The government’s policy 
is that avoiding a rescue assistance would be saving more lives, rather 
than taking lives. Baroness Anelay, then Minister of State at the 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, in written answer to the House of 
Lords defended the United Kingdom’s position thus: 
We do not support planned search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean. 
We believe that they create an unintended “pull factor,” encouraging more 
migrants to attempt the dangerous sea crossing and thereby leading to more 
tragic and unnecessary deaths. The government believes the most effective way 
to prevent refugees and migrants attempting this dangerous crossing is to focus 
our attention on countries of origin and transit, as well as taking steps to fight 
the people smugglers who wilfully put lives at risk by packing migrants into 
unseaworthy boats.244 
 Although this decision was subsequently reversed following 
“international criticisms,”245 the government did so on the condition 
that the rescued migrants would be taken to the nearest seaport and 
would not be allowed to “claim asylum in the United Kingdom.”246 The 
assumption underlying the UK action expresses the political belief, 
shared by not only EU member states but also governments around the 
world, that it is possible for states to control migration and, therefore, 
prevent people from going missing through migration. Given that the 
United Kingdom is a world leader with the capacity to shape future 
direction of international legal discourses, standards, and policy in 
relation to missing migrants, experts and critics fear that the UK 
policy approach could worsen the already existing negative public 
perception about migrants worldwide; a perception often expressed in 
phrases like “sorry but the UK is full to capacity”247 or “let the migrants 
 
243. HOUSE OF COMMONS HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, MIGRATION CRISIS, 2016–
17, HC 24, at 26 (UK).   
244. See Georgia Graham, UK Will Not Support Rescue of Mediterranean 
Migrants, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 28, 2014),  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigr
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perma.cc/BDH7-QFUS] (archived Jan. 15, 2021).  
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COUNCIL (Oct. 28, 2014),  https://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/latest/news/4183_uk_gover
nment_refuses_to_help_rescue_people_at_sea/ [https://perma.cc/7LWU-K2Q7] (arch-
ived Jan. 15, 2021); see also Amnesty International Press Release, Amnesty Condemns 
UK Opt Out of Search and Rescue for Refugees and Migrants (Oct. 28, 2014),  
https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/amnesty-condemns-uk-opt-out-search-and-r
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drown; we have lost our sense of common humanity.”248 According to 
Sarah Teather, the UK Liberal Democrat Chair of the All-Party 
Parliamentary Committee on Refugees: 
[W]e cannot pretend that this problem has nothing to do with us and wash our 
hands as people die. It is the policies we are pursuing, attempting to turn Europe 
into a fortress with no safe routes in, that is forcing migrants into risking their 
lives. We are forcing people to choose between dying in their own war-torn 
country and drowning in the sea.249 
Interestingly, the United Kingdom, through the Royal Navy, has 
played and continues to play a key role in enforcing the EU’s 
“Operation Sophia,”250 the EU’s naval policy operation implemented by 
Frontex,251 which was set up in 2015 at the height of the 
Mediterranean migrant crisis, to destabilise the business activities of 
migrant smugglers and trafficking in persons in the Southern Central 
Mediterranean.252  Although, the United Kingdom only holds an 
observer status on the Frontex management board given that it is not 
part of the Schengen Agreement,253 it has participated in several joint 
 
248. See Anish Kapoor, Let the Migrants Drown in the Mediterranean: We Have 
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249. See Rowena Mason, Outcry as the UK Opts Out of Migrant Rescue—As it 
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Frontex operations.254 The Royal Navy’s presence on the world stage 
implies the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United Kingdom and 
“sends a powerful message that the UK is committed to global affairs 
and provides a stabilising influence.”255 However, with the country 
having left the European Union on 30 January 2020, citing national 
desire and resolve to take back control of its borders, money, and 
laws,256 it is not yet clear what will be the nature of United Kingdom’s 
participation in the future of Europe. Yet, with the pressing problem 
of missing migrants reaching historic levels, the fate of migrants who 
go missing while attempting to cross the Mediterranean is not only 
geographically linked to Europe but also politically and legally linked 
to the United Kingdom as a European state. In addition to migrant 
flows through the Mediterranean routes, very recently, the rising 
“attempts by migrants to reach the UK via the English Channel in 
small boats and dinghies”257 was declared a “major incident” by the 
then-Home Secretary,258 prompting the House of Commons Home 
Affairs Committee to take oral evidence on the crisis in the Channel 
from different national authorities and groups.259 The migrant crisis 
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in the English Channel is a clear indication that the migrant crisis has 
reached British soil.260 However, more recently, the United Kingdom, 
through the combined work of its national agencies, has dealt with the 
problem of migrant deaths within the United Kingdom in ways that 
demonstrate successes that can be achieved when national migration 
policies become transnationally effective. Such national agencies 
include the U.K. Missing Persons Bureau, the National Crime Agency 
U.K. Missing Persons Unit (MPU),261 the U.K. Missing Persons 
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Taskforce,262 the U.K. Border Agency, and the British Police. A good 
example of a case involving the works of these agencies is the tragic 
case of the twenty-three irregular Chinese migrants who were swept 
aside and drowned picking cockles in Morecambe Bay.263 According to 
Simon Robins, the UK authorities deployed not just an enormous 
amount of resources to identify the twenty-one bodies that were 
recovered of the drowned migrants but also sought crucial information 
that involved making a trip to China whilst also collecting relevant 
information within the United Kingdom.264 The British authorities 
also funded the subsequent repatriation of the migrant bodies to 
China.265 There have also been reported cases of smuggled and 
stowaway migrants falling from the landing gears of airplanes within 
the United Kingdom, some of which have been identified by the UK 
authorities and others whose identities are still under investigation 
put on the U.K. Missing Persons Database.266 A more recent example 
is the identification of the bodies of the thirty-nine Vietnamese 
migrants who died in a refrigerated trailer attached to an Essex lorry 
as they were being smuggled into the United Kingdom. Not long after 
the tragic incident, the UK authorities announced: 
We are in direct contact with a number of families in Vietnam and the UK, and 
we believe we have identified families for some of the victims whose journey 
ended in tragedy on our shores . . . the evidence is being gathered across a 
number of jurisdictions worldwide.267   
 These cases demonstrate feats that can be achieved in relation to 
investigation of deaths and identification and return of migrant bodies 
when states have the political will to adopt national migration policies 
that are transnationally effective. Thereby, honouring their obligations 
towards dead and missing migrants and their families. Although, it 
may be argued that these cases were addressed in such an effective 
manner because the migrants involved died on British soil and 
national image was at stake, they nonetheless show that it is not 
impossible for states to facilitate through their national migration 
policies the transnational investigation, identification, and 
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repatriation of migrant bodies to families abroad whilst also 
addressing other needs of affected families beyond the shores of any 
particular state.  
 Although, some successes have been achieved when dealing with 
cases of dead and missing migrants within the United Kingdom, the 
country still faces a real and challenging problem of management of 
migrant bodies. This may not be on a scale comparable to those of EU’s 
Mediterranean states but are nonetheless analogous to those 
confronted in Lesbos.268 It is suggested that dealing with this problem 
in a more transnationally effective way would require greater 
transnational cooperation between the United Kingdom and EU. 
Although the United Kingdom has left the EU, the government has 
said it still wants to continue to collaborate with its European partners 
after Brexit to tackle irregular migration269 in order to find a European 
solution to the migrant crisis. This is more so given that the obligations 
of the United Kingdom towards migrants under the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms remains in 
force.270 Such political commitment, which was reaffirmed in the 2018 
UK–France Sandhurst Treaty,271 and the 2019 Post-Brexit Political 
Declaration reached between the EU and the United Kingdom,272 and 
most recently in the 2020 UK–EU Trade Deal273  demonstrates that 
migration is a key state interest for the United Kingdom and will 
remain so for most of the future; meaning that the transnational effects 
of its national migration policies will continue to be keenly felt by 
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migrant populations worldwide. The subject of migration will continue 
to be a critical challenge for the United Kingdom with net 
immigration.274 It links the United Kingdom to international global 
events such as armed conflicts and systematic human rights abuses in 
the territory of its former colonies that have triggered unprecedented 
migrant flows into Europe and the United Kingdom.275 With the global 
migration governance now at a crucial stage in its institutional 
development, Alexander Betts argues “there is a strong case for the UK 
to develop a coherent ‘global migration governance policy’”276 that, as 
this Article argues, takes the issue of missing migrants into account. 
VI.  SO, WHY NATIONAL MIGRATION POLICIES WITH TRANSNATIONAL 
EFFECTS? 
 In line with the definition of transnational effectiveness of a 
national policy offered at the start of the Article, this Part examines 
the wider rationale that underlies arguments for a transnational 
approach in dealing with cases of missing migrants. Generally, there 
may be numerous reasons why dealing with the global problem of 
missing migrants requires national migration policies with 
transnational effects. However, this Part only deals with three such 
reasons: (a) the transnational nature of migration, (b) the 
extraterritorial reach and effects of positive human rights obligations 
of states, and (c) the externalisation of migration policies and border 
controls.  
A. The Transnational Nature of Migration 
 As stated at the beginning of this Article, the cornerstone of 
transnational law is its recognition of the fact that transnational 
problems, such as missing migrants, require a transnational response 
that includes, but is not limited to, transnational responsibility sharing 
and greater cooperation between states.277 The very nature of the 
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phenomenon of missing migrants implies involvement of origin, 
transit, and destination states who are all caught up in the 
transnational nature of migration. Generally, when migrants are 
driven out of their homes, they go in search of new homes. In searching 
for new homes, they cross borders of states with multiple states 
exercising territorial jurisdiction over them.278 That being the case, it 
is contended that states, especially origin, transit, and arrival states, 
are under a plural obligation to protect migrants and to take measures 
to prevent migrants from going missing. The idea of creating a plural 
obligation for plural states to protect migrants stems from the fact that 
until migrants complete their journeys and reach their destination, 
origin, transit, and arrival states would still be expected to exercise 
jurisdiction in a row.  
 In that way, two possible jurisdictional networks of states are 
created with each network of states seeking to exert control over the 
movement of migrants.279 The first would be a weak queue of states 
with marginal obligations to protect migrants and the second would be 
a solid chain of states with a robust and more effective obligations to 
protect migrants.280 Distinguishing between a chain of states and a 
queue of states in the context of the plural duty of states to protect 
migrants, V.P. Tzevelekos and E.K. Proukaki write: 
The difference between a queue and a chain is that the latter implies 
interconnection. For a chain to exist, a link between its rings is needed . . . rather 
than a detached queue of states that exercise, one after another, exclusive 
jurisdiction in a row, on the basis and within the confines of national territory, 
the scheme that describes migration is that of overlapping and interlinked 
jurisdiction of more than one state over the same person and the situation that 
person is facing. What makes the jurisdiction of multiple states to cross, i.e. what 
establishes the connection between the rings of our fictional jurisdictional chain 
is the transnational nature of migration.281 
 It is suggested that the chain of states analogy for the purpose of 
establishing state jurisdiction over the subject of transnational 
migration works better for the understanding of the migration issues. 
Any concerns arising from it can easily be resolved through the 
instrumentality of international cooperation and consensus building 
between states. It is a fact of common knowledge that migrants move 
through the high sea routes, a territory that is open to all states and 
where no particular state claim exclusive jurisdiction or sovereignty.282 
That being the case, plural states involved—origin, transit, and arrival 
states—all share a plural responsibility to protect migrants “to the 
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extent that each one of them can”283 and to adopt “collective” measures 
to prevent migrant disappearances.284 This is an “interlinked 
responsibility (in the sense of a duty) to protect and, possibly, 
concurrent state responsibility (in the sense of liability) for failure to 
protect.”285 Thus, plural states have shared responsibility to protect 
migrants including “rescue at sea,”286 and may be required to exercise 
parallel concurrent jurisdiction in this regard. This is so because in an 
era of increasing externalisation of migration policies and border 
controls, it is hard to think of any other realistic and effective way to 
deal with migrant deaths and disappearances at sea and borders than 
to press and prevail on states to exercise concurrent jurisdiction to 
protect migrants beyond state borders. 
B. Extraterritorial Reach and Effects of Positive Human Rights 
Obligation of States 
 Generally, as a matter of positive law, human rights obligations 
apply only internally within the territory of a state, for their own 
population’s benefits.287 Modern trends, however, tilt in favour of 
expanding states’ human rights obligations extraterritorially.288 With 
significant numbers of migrants dying and missing at sea and borders 
and their families in most cases residing abroad, it is clear that an 
extraterritorial (transnational) legal and policy approach to tackling 
the crisis is required. However, the new trend of extraterritorial 
expansion of human rights obligations of states has been highly 
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controversial, keenly contested,289 and “under-theorised.”290 Human 
rights courts that apply human rights law extraterritorially justify 
their decisions by reference to state control. That is, effective control of 
territories by states often referred to as the spatial model of 
extraterritorial human rights obligation.291 And also effective 
authority or control over persons abroad,292 often referred to as the 
personal model of extraterritorial human rights obligation. The idea is 
that “the more control a state exercises in an extraterritorial setting, 
the greater the likelihood that the state will be held to its human rights 
duties.”293 However, there are still disagreements about: (1) why 
control matters;294 (2) the type and level of control extraterritorially 
that can activate human rights responsibilities of states; (3) whether, 
apart from control, other factors can activate these responsibilities; 
and (4) whether the obligations can be triggered concurrently or in 
stages having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case.295 
For the ECtHR, the general rule is territorial because Article 1 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights refers to jurisdiction which is 
normally at international law defined by reference to the recognised 
territory of a state; and, further, limited to the espace juridique of the 
Convention. Therefore, the extraterritorial application of the 
Convention is seen as an exception to the general rule and based on 
“special factors” including an appropriate sense of control. From the 
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decision in Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, those range of special factors 
are indeterminate and depend on the facts of cases.296  
 In any case, and for our context, the exercise of extraterritorial 
obligations and migration control by states will always likely be tied to 
the question of jurisdiction. The question of jurisdiction itself serves as 
a threshold criterion for invoking the extraterritorial obligations of 
states over persons, situations, and territories abroad as well as 
applying human rights treaties. Jurisdiction, as we know it, is the 
traditional power that states exercise over their own territories and 
subjects. It is central to state sovereignty, the right to make and 
enforce one’s own laws and protect national interests. As such, it 
concerns the reach of a state’s law (territorial or extraterritorial) and 
what link (internal or external), if any, is required for state laws to 
apply to persons and situations.297 Regardless of which model of 
extraterritorial human rights jurisdiction and obligation is invoked by 
states in relation to migrants outside their territories, it has been 
argued that in cases involving migrants in distress at sea and at border 
zones, plural states have legal obligations under human rights law and 
law of the sea to render assistance to migrants facing distress at sea 
and other death zones regardless of whether the traditional routes or 
links for establishing jurisdiction under international law such as 
territory and nationality exist or not.298 Put differently, there is a 
plurality of human rights duties placed on states to protect migrants 
from going missing and such duties extend extraterritorially, 
regardless of whether migrants have reached state territories or not.  
 The ECtHR reiterated this position in Hirshi Jamaa v. Italy 
where it found against the practice of preventive refoulement of 
migrants by some states and further stressed that nonrefoulement 
human rights obligations of states apply extraterritorially.299 This 
extraterritorial obligation extends even to the high sea, especially 
when a state’s coastguard intercepts or interdicts migrants and seeks 
to return them to unsafe places. With thousands of migrants already 
dead or missing while attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea into 
Europe, the failure of frontline states to take action to save human 
lives would be incompatible with existing and binding provisions of 
human rights law, while also amounting to a moral failure. While the 
ECtHR’s respective decisions in Al-Skeini and Hirsi Jamaa expressly 
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reflect the current position of human rights law and practice in the EU, 
they also implicitly reflect the understanding that human migration is 
a transnational phenomenon wherein externalised migration policies 
and border controls have increasingly become a major response 
approach by states. 
C. Externalisation of Migration Policies and Border Controls 
 The United Kingdom has always provided protection to people 
who reached their territories and presented legitimate claims to 
international protection.300 While granting international protection to 
people fleeing persecution and armed conflict is most commendable, a 
parallel disturbing development is that, over the years, the United 
Kingdom and other European states have increasingly aspired to adopt 
bilateral and multilateral externalisation policies to control migration. 
These controls, as mentioned earlier in this Article, seek to strike deals 
with third countries—mostly origin, transit, and countries of first 
arrival—to act as border keepers in order to control flow of migrants 
seeking refuge in their territories. Through such externalisation 
practices, states attempt to prevent, intercept, or interdict migrants 
from arriving at destination states. Italy’s ill-fated deal with Libya to 
intercept and pull back migrants is often cited as the most obvious 
example.301 Such extraterritorial actions to curb migrant and refugee 
flows have been linked to politicisation of national migration 
policies.302 A few examples of externalisation of border controls and 
migration policies include the much-criticised EU–Turkey Action 
Plan303 and the “Australia Pacific Solution”304 as well as the “EU–
Africa Joint Valletta Action Plan”305 (to be monitored by the Khartoum 
and Rabat Process respectively).306 But then, the EU and other states 
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303. EU-Turkey Statement 2016, supra note 128. 
304. See Phillips, supra note 236, at 2. 
305. African Union, EU-Africa Joint Valletta Action Plan—Conclusions 2018,  
AFRICA EU P’SHIP (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/stay-
informed/news/joint-valletta-action-plan-conclusions-2018 [https://perma.cc/2DGL-6R
WA] (archived Jan. 21, 2021). 
306. The Khartoum Process is the “EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative,” 
which seeks to create a common understanding of human trafficking and smuggling of 
migrants, creating opportunities for balanced partnership in the spirit of shared 
responsibility and enhanced cooperation on migration and mobility between the EU and 
Africa. See generally EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (Khartoum Process), 
IOM, https://www.iom.int/eu-horn-africa-migration-route-initiative-khartoum-process 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/K38E-UPK2] (archived Jan. 21, 2021). The 
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consistently claim that externalisation policies are actually devised 
with good intentions—to protect lives and achieve safe, orderly and 
regular migration.  
 For example, the EU–AU Action Plan declares that it aims to stop 
migrant smuggling and trading in humans in order to effectively tackle 
the humanitarian crisis occasioned by irregular migration originating 
from Africa to Europe. But the result in practice seems not to always 
reflect the supposed protection and life-saving humanitarian goals. For 
example, the hitherto obscure negative impact of externalisation 
policies came to the global limelight for the first time when border 
communities like Calais, Lampedusa, and Lesbos emerged as the 
twilight zones of indeterminate migration regulation, with migrants 
seeking to arrive to those zones going missing in the process. However, 
even though externalisation policies may not always be devised with 
the best of motives by states, they nonetheless demonstrate the 
capacity of frontline states to deal with problems abroad. If states 
deploy a little of the percentage of resources used in implementing and 
operationalising externalisation policies to also set up transnational 
communication channels to search for missing migrants and reach out 
to their families, the crisis of missing migrants may well be half solved.  
 Whatever is the case, the argument here is that some policy and 
border externalisation practices have human rights implications for 
migrants. For instance, some of them tend to militarise the borders and 
make migration routes become even more dangerous,307 thereby 
increasing the risk of migrant deaths and disappearances. Others 
appear to be fuelling human rights abuses outside Europe.308 And 
others still seem to be promoting repressive regimes309 since most of 
the third countries used as border guards are governed by 
nondemocratic governments with proven records of human rights 
abuses. In these circumstances, it would be valid to claim that 
externalisation implicates the extraterritorial human rights obligation 
of states to deal with migration risks arising from such practices. Such 
risks would require parallel national policies with transnational effects 
to deal with. The increasing need to adopt such a transnational 
 
Rabat Process, on the other hand, is the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and 
Development bringing together countries of origin, transit, and destination of the 
migration routes linking Central, West and North Africa with Europe. For more 
information on the Rabat Process, see The Rabat Process, RABAT PROCESS, 
https://www.rabat-process.org/en/about/rabat-process (last visited Jan. 21, 2021) [https:
//perma.cc/89CT-SJR6] (archived Jan. 21, 2021). 
307. See MARK AKKERMAN, EXPANDING THE FORTRESS: THE POLICIES, THE 
PROFITEERS AND THE PEOPLE SHAPED BY EU’S BORDER EXTERNALISATION PROGRAMME 
34 (Nick Buxton & Wendela de Vries eds., 2018). 
308. See id. at 35. 
309. See id. 
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approach reflects the principle of “shared responsibility of states”310 
and “greater state cooperation”311 in dealing with human problems and 
such shared undertaking is the cornerstone of the newly adopted UN 
Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) which 
is examined below. 
VII.  THE UN GLOBAL COMPACT (GCM) AND MISSING MIGRANTS 
 In 2016, the UN General Assembly adopted the New York 
Declaration on Refugees and Migrants, comprising of two compacts: 
Global Compact for Refugees (GCR) and Global Compact for Safe, 
Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM). Both Compacts represent 
intergovernmental nontreaty, nonbinding agreements which set out 
principles, objectives, and partnerships for refugees and migration 
governance at the international level. This Article, with its focus on 
UK policies in relation to missing migrants, concentrates on the GCM 
and specifically Objective 8(a-f) which seeks to address the 
humanitarian challenges arising from the perilous journeys of 
migrants who died and went missing in an attempt to reach safe 
international destinations. While this Article limits its consideration 
of the GCM to Objective 8, the provision is itself not exhaustive and 
cannot be read in isolation of other relevant provisions of the compact.  
 The Compact is a complementarity instrument built on the 
framework of global partnerships and solidarity. It is clear from the 
totality of the texts used in the compact that Objective 8 alongside 
other objectives312 are mutually inclusive and reinforcing and should 
 
310. For detailed discussion on shared responsibility, see Andre Nollkaemper, The 
Duality of Shared Responsibility, 24 CONTEMP. POL. 524, 528 (2018); see also Andre 
Nollkaemper & Dov Jacobs, Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Conceptual 
Framework, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 359, 366 (2013); Marion Smiley, Collective 
Responsibility, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Aug. 8, 2005), https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/collective-responsibility/ [https://perma.cc/56UU-39U2] (archived Jan. 21, 2021). 
311. It is important to mention that neither international law nor the global 
compact clearly specifies what level or kind of cooperation is required of states in any 
case, nor does either prescribe how to distribute or allocate the duty to cooperate. David 
Miller, while discussing this problem in the context of national responsibility and global 
justice, stated that “an undistributed duty . . . to which everybody is subject is likely to 
be exercised by nobody unless it can be allocated in some way.” See DAVID MILLER, 
NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 98 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007); see also 
Douglas Guilfoyle, The Legal Challenges in Fighting Piracy, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSE TO SOMALI PIRACY 130 (Bibi Van Ginkel & Frans-Paul Van Der Putten eds., 
2010) (discussing the same problem in the context of suppressing piracy at sea, Guilfoyle 
stated that “while a duty to cooperate to the fullest possible extent may seem a strong 
obligation, the international community has not agreed that it has any specific minimum 
content. Identifying a breach of a duty to cooperate is notoriously difficult . . .”).  
312. See, in particular, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, 
supra note 26, objectives 1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 17, 21. 
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be read in that light.313 In sum, the main aim of Objective 8 is to save 
lives314 and “establish coordinated international efforts on missing 
migrants.”315 It enjoins states to commit to prevention of migrant 
fatalities through individual and joint search and rescue of 
migrants,316 exchange and collection of information in a standardised 
way,317 as well as identification of the dead318 and family outreach.319 
Particularly relevant is the requirement that states should review 
their migration policies and laws to ensure that their impacts “do not 
raise or create the risk of migrants going missing.”320 The goals 
advanced by Objective 8 are central to effectively dealing with the 
crisis of missing migrants at the international level, but what is not so 
clear is how states, given the nontreaty legal status of the Compact, 
might implement its contents nationally, and what would be the 
consequences of states’ failure to implement.  
A. The Legal Status of the GCM and Prospects of National 
Implementation: The Way Forward for the United Kingdom 
 The key reason why the United Kingdom and other European 
states endorsed the GCM is that it is a “non-treaty,”321 nonlegally 
binding instrument which respects state sovereignty and allows states 
to adopt their own migration policies. The GCM does not create a right 
to migration or new rights for migrants, it does not create or impose 
new obligations on states, and it does not even provide for 
regularisation of irregular migrants.322 The GCM “is [not] declaratory 
 
313. See Syd Bolton & Catriona Jarvis, Objective 8: Save Lives and Establish 
Coordinated International Efforts on Missing Migrants, in THE UN’S GLOBAL COMPACT 
FOR SAFE, ORDERLY AND REGULAR MIGRATION: ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL DRAFT, 
OBJECTIVE BY OBJECTIVE 25 (Elspeth Guild & Tugba Basaran eds., 2018). See generally 
Syd Bolton & Catriona Jarvis, Objective 8: Save Lives and Establish Coordinated 
International Efforts on Missing Migrants, in FIRST PERSPECTIVES ON THE ZERO DRAFT 
(5 FEBRUARY 2018) FOR THE UN GLOBAL COMPACT ON SAFE, ORDERLY AND REGULAR 
MIGRATION (Elspeth Guild & Tugba Basaran eds., 2018). 
314. See Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, supra note 26; 
see also Jane McAdam, The Global Compacts on Refugees and Migration: A New Era for 
International Protection, 30 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 571, 571–74 (2018). 
315. Global Compact of Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, supra note 26, ¶ 24. 
316. See id. ¶ 24(a). 
317. See id. ¶ 24(e). 
318. See id. ¶ 24(f). 
319. See id. ¶ 24(c)–(d). 
320. Id. ¶ 24(b). 
321.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (defining a treaty; the convention’s provisions are generally accepted 
as being declaratory of customary international law). 
322. See generally Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, 
FRENCH MINISTRY FOR EUROPE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FRANCE DIPLOMACY (2018), 
https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/united-nations/global-compact-
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of, or establishes customary international law relating to safe, orderly 
and regular migration.”323 In determining the status of an 
international instrument, the decisive factor is whether the 
negotiating states intend the document to be binding.324 This intention 
is to be gleaned from the explicit terms of the document itself as well 
as the surrounding circumstances under which it was concluded.325 
The form, content, language, and surrounding negotiating history of 
the GCM clearly confirm that states do not intend it to be binding. The 
GCM itself declares that it is nonbinding;326 that it upholds state 
sovereignty;327 and that implementation will be based on “national 
realities, capacities, and levels of development, and respecting national 
policies and priorities.”328 It also cannot apply directly to proceedings 
in domestic courts, although it can be a persuasive guideline for 
interpretation of existing international norms. Since it lacks a definite 
legal status,329 what transnational effect, if any, might the GCM have? 
It is clear the GCM is a cooperative multilateral framework which 
consolidates and builds on existing norms of international human 
rights law (which is already binding on states),330 in particular, the 
principles of nondiscrimination and nonregression. The principle of 
nonregression specifically requires that existing norms already 
adopted by states not be revised by any state if doing so implies 
retreating or going backwards on the standards of human rights 
protection.331  
 While the GCM is not legally binding stricto sensu, it is politically 
binding.332 This is evident in the consistent use of the phrase “we 
 
for-safe-orderly-and-regular-migration/article/global-compact-for-safe-orderly-and-regu
lar-migration [https://perma.cc/X9YN-288H] (archived March 16, 2021). 
323. Letter from Virginia Hardy, Deputy Solicitor-General, and Victoria Hallum, 
International Legal Advisor, to Winston Peters, N.Z. Minister of Foreign Affs. ¶ 14 (Dec. 
17, 2018). 
324. Id. ¶ 7. 
325. See, e.g., Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Betweeen Qatar 
and Bahrain (Qatar v Bahr.), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 112, 
¶¶ 26–27 (July 1). 
326. Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, supra note 26, ¶ 7. 
327. Id. ¶ 15. 
328. Id. ¶ 41. 
329. See Alessandro Bufalini, The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular 
Migration: What Is Its Contribution to International Migration Law?, 58 QUESTIONS 
INT’L L. 5, 7–11 (2019). 
330. The Migration Compact contains over 45 references to human rights. See 
Elspeth Guild, The UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration: What 
Place for Human Rights?, 30 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 661, 661 (2019). 
331. ALAN MILLER, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A NEW HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 
TO IMPROVE PEOPLE’S LIVES, REPORT TO THE FIRST MINSTER 68–69 (2018). 
332. Kathryn Allinson, Paul Erdunast, Elspeth Guild & Tugba Basaran, GCM: 
The Legal Status of the UN’s Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration 
in International Law and UK Law, REFUGEE L. INITIATIVE BLOG ON REFUGEE L. & 
FORCED MIGRATION, SCH. ADVANCED STUD., UNIV. OF LONDON (Jan. 31, 2019), 
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commit”333 throughout the GCM. When a state politically commits to a 
course of action within an international cooperative framework, it 
signifies the intention to respect the commitments and actionable 
objectives created by that framework. By all indications, whether 
states intend it or not, the GCM can be treated as soft law. Soft law, as 
we know it, plays a key part in the transnational lawmaking process334 
although, as a social phenomenon, it transcends the gamut of the 
“classical and familiar legal categories by which scholars usually 
describe and explain both the creation and the legal authority of 
international norms.”335 It can have direct, qualifying, interpretative, 
and political effects.336 Generally, when the obligations created by 
international soft law are implemented nationally, soft law, like the 
GCM, can actually play hardball. Such can be used to counter, confirm, 
affirm, or reaffirm the existence and/or validity of existing hard laws337 
as well as existing soft laws.338 Whether binding or otherwise, the most 
significant questions to determine are: (1) What would be the long-term 
impact of the GCM? And, (2) how can it be implemented nationally and 
to what extent can it influence national migration policies?  
 Even though the GCM lacks a well-defined legal status, its norms, 
contents, and objectives can actually be imported by national 
authorities for lesson-drawing to improve the quality of policymaking 
at the national level—what experts call “policy transfer.” Policy 
transfer according to Dolowitz and Marsh is the “process in which 
knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions 
and ideas in one political setting (past or present) is used in the 
development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions 
and ideas in another political setting.”339 It is about “lesson-drawing” 
as Rose puts it,340 but also about learning, knowledge, and adaptation 
 
https://rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/2019/01/31/gcm-commentary-the-legal-status/ [https://perma.
cc/Q5RT-YPXW] (archived Feb. 3, 2021). 
333. See Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, supra note 26, 
¶¶ 17–39.  
334. Nagihan Cihangir, The Role of Soft Law and the Interplay Between Soft Law 
and Hard Law in the Context of International Human Rights, 8 L. & JUST. REV. 201, 202 
(2017). 
335. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 
12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 420, 420 (1991). 
336. Tadeusz Gruchalla-Wesierski, A Framework for Understanding “Soft Law,” 
30 MCGILL L.J. 37, 52 (1984). 
337. See Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, 
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 788 
(2010). 
338. See id. 
339. David P. Dolowitz & David Marsh, Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy 
Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making, 13 GOVERNANCE: INT’L J. POL’Y & ADMIN. 5, 5 
(2000). Please note that scholars like Richard Ross, Dolowitz and Marsh discussed the 
concept of policy transfer and/or lesson-drawing in broader terms than I can include here. 
340. Richard Rose, What is Lesson-Drawing?, 11 J. PUB. POL’Y 3, 3 (1991). 
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of evidence341 at all levels—national, regional, and international. In 
the United Kingdom, policy transfer/lesson-drawing from 
international frameworks to enhance national policymaking is not 
new. The Cabinet office consistently advises the UK government to 
undertake “outward-looking policy-making that learns lessons from 
other countries and takes account of developments in the European 
and international spheres.”342  
 The fact that the GCM is negotiated at the UN level (a unifying 
globalising force) enhances the “opportunity structures”343 for such 
transfer/lesson-drawing to occur. However, looking at the form, 
content, language, and negotiating history of the GCM, and given that 
it is built on global partnerships and cooperation between states, one 
wonders how states can meaningfully implement its objectives 
domestically without adopting national policy frameworks that are 
transnationally effective. The central argument put forward in this 
Article is that the UK migration policies in relation to missing 
migrants must become more transnationally effective to facilitate the 
implementation of Objective 8 and other relevant provisions of the 
GCM nationally. The rationale, as noted earlier, for promoting such a 
transnationally relevant national policy, stems from the 
extraterritorial nature of human rights obligations of states, the 
transnational nature of modern migration, and the externalisation of 
border controls and migration policies. However, despite the provisions 
of the GCM, states, as highlighted earlier, sometimes argue that until 
migrants reach their territories, they do not have any legal obligations 
towards them or their families, and lending a helping hand in such a 
situation is at most a matter of morality for which states are not 
necessarily legally bound or responsible. So, are states’ obligations 
towards missing migrants under the GCM and other international 
legal norms moral but not legal? 
B. Are States’ Obligations Towards Missing Migrants Under the GCM 
and Other International Legal Norms Moral but Not Legal? 
 The question whether the obligations of states towards migrants 
under the GCM and other international legal norms are moral but not 
legal should be answered in the negative. It is argued that, although 
several aspects of the problem of missing migrants concerns moral 
obligations of states, those obligations—especially the duty to save 
lives of migrants at sea and borders—are also legal. The moral-legal 
 
341. Timothy Legrand, Overseas and Over Here: Policy Transfer and Evidence-
Based Policy-Making, 33 POL’Y STUD. 329, 341–42 (2012). 
342. See STRATEGIC POLICY MAKING TEAM, BRITISH CABINET OFFICE, 
PROFESSIONAL POLICY MAKING FOR THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY ¶ 5.1 (1991). 
343. Legrand, supra note 341, at 335. 
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character of the obligations has been acknowledged by the EU in its 
2015 statement on developments in the Mediterranean.344 One expert 
argued that “the fact that people attempting to reach the European 
Union are paying with their lives in the thousands is a moral 
scandal.”345 International human rights law that creates and imposes 
the legal obligations on states to protect migrants is often consistently 
claimed to be an international legal instrument that grounds the most 
basic considerations about international morality.346 Thus, 
international human rights law, in addition to being the primary 
source of states’ legal obligations towards migrants, also constitutes a 
source of moral obligations of states towards migrants in need of safety 
and protection. In addition, the relevant obligations of states towards 
missing migrants are not only a creation of international human rights 
instruments, refugee laws, and sea treaties (which implies their legal 
character and enforceability), they are also a result of different political 
declarations on missing migrants such as those contained in the 
Compact (which lends credence to its moral character). Legal 
obligation seeks to attribute responsibility to states based on existing 
laws—mainly, international law of responsibility and international 
human rights law. Both laws constitute the main sources of law with 
the greatest relevance when it comes to the obligation of states to 
redress issues around international and forced migration.347  
 The foundational value upon which legal responsibility is based is 
that, the law having created a system of reasonable expectations in 
society, there is a need for the legal ordering of society based on those 
expectations. Where those expectations such as the state duty to 
protect migrant lives are not met, it could amount to a moral failure. 
This clearly suggests that moral obligations of states are always 
engraved in the law creating the obligations. Generally, moral 
obligation implies the blameworthiness and/or praiseworthiness that 
we may attribute to actors (states) for their actions or conducts348 in 
relation to any matter at all, including the issue of missing migrants. 
 
344. See European Commission Statement on Developments in the Mediterranean, 
EUR. COMM'N (Apr. 19, 2015), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/
STATEMENT_15_4800 [https://perma.cc/R84E-UW98] (archived Feb. 3, 2021); see also 
Bomberger: Accounting for the Missing Is Our Moral but Also a Legal Obligation, FENA 
NEWS (Aug. 30, 2020), https://www.fena.news/international/bomberger-accounting-for-
the-missing-is-our-moral-but-also-a-legal-obligation/ [https://perma.cc/3SBA-DP4R] 
(archived Feb. 3, 2021). 
345. Katharina Senge, Who Bears Responsibility? Models and Perspectives of 
European Refugee Policy, in MIGRATION AND REFUGEES 10, 12 (Gerhard Wahlers ed., 
2015). 
346. See Haule, supra note 93, at 388–92. 
347. MEGAN BRADLEY, REFUGEE REPATRIATION: JUSTICE, RESPONSIBILITY AND 
REDRESS 36 (2013). 
348. Alexa Zellentin, Outcome Responsibility: Fallible Beings Acting in an 
Uncertain World 6 (UCD Sch. of Pol. & Int’l Rels., Working Paper No. 7, 2018). 
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The moral significance of the risks that state actions and restrictive 
migration policies may impose on migrants gives rise to legal 
obligations for which the states are bound. Thus, for moral 
responsibility, our focus is on the moral character of states, and it 
involves the opinions and judgments in the form of “appraisal or 
censure we may form regarding the behaviour of others in matters of 
morality.”349 It is argued that states fulfilling their moral obligations 
to account for the missing not only aids and enhances the development 
of international law generally, but also specifically strengthens the 
international law of human rights and dignity. This argument can be 
grounded in the current international law of state responsibility and 
general principles of international law.  
 However, the point must not be missed that part of the reason why 
states sometimes fail to accept their legal obligation to protect 
migrants is the apparent lack of clarity as to the territorial scope of the 
states’ obligations towards migrants. This is especially in relation to 
cases where they are still in transit at sea and pre-border zones and 
have yet to reach the borders or territory of states of transit and 
destination.350 The general principle of law is that jurisdiction of states 
is primarily territorial, and viewed from this perspective, states do not 
become responsible to take on migrants until they reach their territory. 
Consequently, if migrants die or go missing in transit at sea and 
borders before they reach state territories, that is, outside the frontiers 
of states, then states are not responsible to search for, recover, and 
bury their bodies or repatriate their bodies to their families in the 
origin states. But scholars like Nagore Casas have raised questions 
regarding the plausibility of this argument against the background of 
the significant increase in extraterritorial activities of states targeted 
at preventing migrants from reaching their territories so as not to 
invoke their territorial jurisdiction and obligations over and towards 
such migrants.351  
 The argument that states have no obligations to migrants until 
they reach state frontiers may be attributed to three key factors which 
indicate a normative gap in the international law of state responsibility 
in relation to missing migrants. First, the high seas where the 
migrants are drowning represents a complex and highly fragmented 
space of migration where refugee, human rights, and maritime law 
impose various obligations on states, including the duty to render 
 
349. Nimrod Z. Kovner, Migration in a Warming World: On the Responsibility and 
Obligations of States Towards Climate Change Immigrants 53 (Apr. 2017) (unpublished 
Ph.D. Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science) (on file with the London 
School of Economics and Political Science). 
350. María-Teresa Gil-Bazo, The Practice of Mediterranean States in the Context 
of the European Union’s Justice and Home Affairs External Dimension: The Safe Third 
Country Concept Revisited, 18 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 571, 571–72 (2006). 
351. Casas, supra note 100, at 162–63. 
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assistance to migrants and others facing perils at sea, yet, the “precise 
division and content of these sovereign responsibilities remain 
contested and subject to varying interpretations.”352 The international 
law of the sea it would appear does not explicitly create a reciprocal 
relationship between migrants facing distress at sea and state flagged 
ships, not least since the circumstances under which migrants’ boats 
get into distress at sea are not those for which the sea treaties were 
originally negotiated.  
 As a result, the drowning irregular boat migrants find themselves 
in an increasingly hostile sea space of migration where law, geo-
politics, and sovereign power clash and where multiple states are keen 
to deconstruct, shift, and trade off obligations in relation to seaborne 
migrants. The legal difficulty caused by a lack of a reciprocal 
relationship between the migrants and state-flagged ships leaves room 
for and contributes to the denial and/or failure of states to acknowledge 
their responsibility. When responsibility denial happens, Cuttitta 
argues that states attempt either to shift the responsibility for migrant 
deaths and disappearances to other agents, such as people smugglers 
and human traffickers, or blame the migrants themselves for their own 
deaths, having attempted the dangerous sea and border crossings 
despite warnings.353 The shifting of responsibility may allow states to 
delocalise migrant deaths, whilst also disconnecting any linkage of 
state migration and border policies to migrant deaths. The second is 
the lack of clarity regarding the essential elements of applicable legal 
frameworks to be applied, the status of journeying migrants under 
international law, and under what circumstances the obligations of 
states towards such migrants can be engaged.354 And the third issue is 
the absence of a clear and explicit rule on how obligations should be 
properly distributed, shared, or allocated to multiple states in practice 
in the context of missing migrants. These limitations in the law 
notwithstanding, it is contended that, under international law of 
human rights and dignity, states have a general obligation to protect 




352. Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen & Tanja E. Aalberts, Sovereignty at Sea: The 
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Working Paper No. 18, 2010). 
353. Paolo Cuttitta, Preface: The Increasing Focus on Border Deaths, in BORDER 
DEATHS: CAUSES, DYNAMICS AND CONSEQUENCES OF MIGRATION-RELATED MORTALITY, 
supra note 61, at 9, 11–12. 
354. Casas, supra note 100, at 162. 
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 This Article has stressed that regional and national migration 
policies require a degree of global governance and, therefore, when 
issues about missing migrants are raised, the first question should not 
be “so then, in whose territory did the migrants die or disappear.” 
Rather, it should be addressed from a transnational human rights 
perspective. It is concluded that this should be the way forward for the 
United Kingdom and other frontline EU states as it can only take a 
transnationally effective policy to reach the international community’s 
goal of preventing migrant deaths and migrants going missing at sea 
and EU external borders. The United Kingdom and EU policy 
initiatives should, for example, specifically address issues around 
investigation, search and rescue of migrants, identification, 
management and repatriation of migrant bodies, and family outreach.  
 The United Kingdom’s current policies are insufficient to address 
the issue of missing migrants, but by adopting a transnationally 
effective national migration policy that is international law and GCM 
compliant, the United Kingdom could shape international legal 
discourses on migration, standards, and policy. The country can lead 
by example. As a permanent member of the UNSC (a position of 
significant political influence on the world stage), it can actively adopt 
a transnational policy stance geared towards optimising compatibility, 
setting important agendas for the future whilst catering effectively to 
those that already have reached its shores. This might be contrary to 
current policies that are more interested in pushing migrants away 
and discouraging them from undertaking journeys, but an approach is 
needed that will take international legal provisions seriously through 
policies and the resultant practices. With measurable national targets 
to achieve the GCM’s Objectives, it has been suggested that the GCM 
could become a vitally important international legal instrument in the 
future.355 The key purpose of the GCM is realisation of safe, orderly, 
and regular migration in the world and, as such, transnationally 
effective national migration policies must be designed with these 
broader objectives in mind. Therefore, revised policies that are 
transnationally effective will ensure that the number of migrants 
trapped in death zones abroad is reduced and investigate, if not 
prevent, tragic deaths. Not least since migrants are a key contributor 
to the UK economy,356 thus their well-being is in the state’s interest. 
 
355. See Kevin Appleby, Global Compact on Migration: Issues at Play, in 
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION POLICY REPORT: PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONTENT AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GLOBAL COMPACT FOR SAFE, ORDERLY, AND REGULAR 
MIGRATION 110, 114 (Kevin Appleby & Donald Kerwin eds., 2018). 
356. Gareth Mulvey, When Policy Creates Politics: The Problematizing of 
Immigration and the Consequences for Refugee Integration in the UK, 23 J. REFUGEE 
STUD. 437, 447 (2018) (quoting Charles Clarke’s statement contained in the Home Office 
Press Release of 7 February 2005). 
